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 Homelessness at the Cathedral 
Marc L. Roark* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that legal restraints against homeless persons are 
resolved by applying certain nuisance-like approaches.  By drawing on nui-
sance restraints that adopt property-based and social-identity information, 
courts and decision-makers choose approaches that create conflict between 
homeless identities and adopted social identities.  These approaches tend to 
relegate the social choice of whether to tolerate homeless persons to one of 
established social order (property) or broadly conceived notions of liberty 
(constitutional rights or due process rights).  This Article argues for a broad-
er conception of social identity, which may force parties to internalize certain 
costs of action, tolerate certain uses, or abate the full range of property rights 
that the law would otherwise allow in different social settings.  Considering 
the question of “undesirable” uses of space – both on private and public land 
– helps articulate a narrative of property that moves beyond the rhetoric of 
economics-bound entitlements and affords a broader, more honest character-
ization.  Conceived in this way, property entitlements represent information 
about how society defines, refines, enforces, and rejects its collective identity 
through the legal recognition of property entitlements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The law of property is entrenched with information – information about 
markets, information about wealth, and information about social identity.1  It 
is well regarded as a catalyst for economic stability through systematic trans-
fer of information.2  It is shaped by political power and expectations of social 
entrenchment.3  It communicates what is important by being the canvas of our 
creativity.4  It says something about what we value by how we manage it 
when it’s scarce5 and how we do not when it’s plentiful.6  We remember why 
 
 1. As Nicholas Blomley wrote, 
[P]roperty more generally is far from a self-evident category.  It is . . . a “so-
cial relation that defines the property holder with respect to something of val-
ue . . . against all others.”  To an anthropologist, it is a “network of social rela-
tions that governs the conduct of people with respect to the use and disposition 
of things.”  Marx pointed to “the relations of individuals to one another with 
reference to the material, instrument and product of labor.” 
NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING THE CITY: URBAN LAND AND THE POLITICS OF 
PROPERTY 2 (2004) [hereinafter BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING THE CITY] (citing DANIEL W. 
BLOMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(1991); E.A. HOEBEL, ANTHROPOLOGY: THE STUDY OF MAN 424 (1966); 5 KARL 
MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, COLLECTED WORKS 32 (1975)); see also CAROL M. 
ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE, AND 
SOCIETY 199-200 (Robert W. Gordon & Margaret J. Radin eds., 1994) (describing 
property relationships as formed by clear and unclear rules of transactions and legal 
claims); Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public and Private Accommo-
dations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1455-56 (1996) (describing 
property relationships as those governed by shared responsibilities). 
 2. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM 
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 15-17 (2000). 
 3. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER 
TO TERRORISM 55 (1989) (stating that mass intrusion of unoccupied public lands by 
impoverished Peruvians is explainable because “people are capable of violating a 
system which does not accept them, not so they can live in anarchy but so that they 
can build a different system which respects a minimum of essential rights”). 
 4. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A 
Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1243 (2005) (articulat-
ing the freedom-promoting conception of property as one which intermingles notions 
of property and freedom.  The standpoint conceptualizes property as an ever-evolving 
institution in relation to various resources.  Freedom interplays with the property view 
from a functional perspective of human creativity.  “[I]t asks what they are able to do, 
which forms of human potential they have turned into actual capabilities that they can 
in fact exercise.”). 
 5. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347, 356 (1967) (describing conditions in which property rights become more promi-
nent when resources are scarce).  See generally Haochen Sun, Toward a New Social-
Political Theory of the Public Trust Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 563, 564 (2011) (pro-
posing a new model of the public trust doctrine – which relies only on government 
actors as sole trustees of public resources – and taking an aggressive view of resource 
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we acquired it and tell stories about why it remains meaningful.7  Property 
captivates our attention as a measure of prosperity and as a signal of power 
(and its opposite – powerlessness).8  It remains – as Blackstone noted – a 
catalyst of our imaginations and our emotions, whether acquired by hook or 
crook, and then honored as the thing that validates our social life.9  The law 
of property reflects our collective identity – what we value, what we do not 
and why we think it matters. 
Property, at its core, is also about social approval of one’s occupancy of 
space.10  The law of property reflects a collective identity of the society that 
recognizes its resource value, enforceability, or import.  Laws and decisions 
relating to land-use, whether criminal, contractual, or tort-based, reflect socie-
ty’s approval or disapproval of individual or group actions in public and pri-
vate spaces.11  As a broad matter, space allocation is important because socie-
 
management that involves the participation of the judiciary and citizens asserting 
fundamental rights over public space as well). 
 6. See Demsetz, supra note 5, at 349 (noting that when the costs of property 
rights are low and resources are available, property rights are likely to emerge). 
 7. See U.S. on Behalf of Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. Platt, 730 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 
(D. Ariz. 1990) (finding an easement by prescription arose in favor of the Zuni Indi-
ans, whose traditional periodic pilgrimage crossed private lands). 
 8. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1714-15 
(1993) (articulating the role of being white as a threshold towards other social access 
– such as property ownership, political access, and increased mobility).  Similarly, 
Acting White, by Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, suggests that the “trespass” on 
whiteness by other minority groups created the status-based phenomenon of reducing 
the social salience of their racial identity.  See DEVON CARBADO & MITU GULATI, 
ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA 43 (2013). 
 9. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3. 
 10. BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING THE CITY, supra note 1, at 7 (describing the im-
portant effects of ownership on property as “underpinn[ing] a particular and conse-
quential view of property, power, and social life”).  As Blomley goes on to say, 
“[O]nly certain relations are named ‘property,’ and certain social actors recognized as 
viable owners.”  Id.  Don Mitchell also describes the way systems of public and pri-
vate property have shaped expectations that result in hostility towards homeless per-
sons in the form of ordinances and other criminal sanctions designed to preserve pri-
vate property interests.  See Don Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law: The 
Roots and Implications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United States, in THE LEGAL 
GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE 17 (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 
2001) [hereinafter Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law].  Mitchell also de-
scribes in another one of his works how law becomes the backdrop for movements of 
legalized capital that shape property expectations.  See DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO 
THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC SPACE 29 (2003) [hereinafter 
MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY]. 
 11. I call public space “property” based on the way the properties are responsive 
to other entitlements.  Blomley writes that “the ownership model [creates] ‘a certain 
cultural myopia’ towards other forms of property” – like public property – due to the 
power that private property has in the social framework.  See BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING 
THE CITY, supra note 1, at 8.  Carol Rose has also observed this point that public 
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ty collectively recognizes one person’s entitlement over another’s to space.12  
It is also important because in recognizing property entitlements, property 
systems say something about our collective identity – a cultural contract so-
to-speak.13  Cases involving homeless persons demonstrate the way collective 
identity shapes court decisions. 
In homelessness cases, courts allocate space (and take away space) ac-
cording to how they perceive the purported use in relation to collective identi-
ties.14  Those cases also speak to our collective identity by relating society’s 
choices to not recognize an entitlement to space.15  Tacking on another layer, 
the actual use of a space, whether constituting property or not, is often shaped 
by collective social judgments that reflect a social identity.16  In other words, 
it may not be just the creation of the legal entitlement that tells us something 
 
property’s complexity, amorphous quality, and tendency to be viewed as communitar-
ian rather than isolationist leads to the wrong conclusion that public property “do[es] 
not look like property at all . . . .”  Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: 
Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
129, 132-33, 140 (1998).  Thus the governance of space sometimes reaches to police 
who should occupy spaces in the guise of policing activities in that space.  See GARY 
BLASI & UCLA SCH. OF LAW FACT INVESTIGATION CLINIC, POLICING OUR WAY OUT 
OF HOMELESSNESS? THE FIRST YEAR OF THE SAFER CITIES INITIATIVE ON SKID ROW 6-
7 (2007), available at http://www.lafla.org/pdf/policinghomelessness.pdf (describing 
the significantly higher number of vagrancy and jay-walking citations in the skid row 
area of Los Angeles, than in other parts of the city). 
 12. See e.g., Gregg W. Kettles, Formal Versus Informal Allocation of Land in a 
Commons: The Case of the MacArthur Park Sidewalk Vendors, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 49, 82 (2006) (discussing space allocation and perceived entitlement to space 
among street vendors in Los Angeles, California). 
 13. Recognizing the legal toleration for uses of property also recognizes the 
law’s tolerance for the identity that leads to the uses.  Davina Cooper describes this as 
the “cultural contract” in which an “imaginary settlement through which the consent 
of [the] community to a particular set of social and governance relations is identified.”  
See Davina Cooper, Out of Place: Symbolic Domains, Religious Rights and the Cul-
tural Contract, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE, su-
pra note 10, at 43. 
 14. See generally Farida Ali, Limiting the Poor’s Right to Public Space: Crimi-
nalizing Homelessness in California, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 197 (2014). 
 15. DAVID SIBLEY, GEOGRAPHIES OF EXCLUSION: SOCIETY AND DIFFERENCE IN 
THE WEST 78 (1995) (observing that “difference[s] will register as deviance, a source 
of threat to be kept out through the erection of strong boundaries, or expelled”).  Si-
bley argues that the necessity for purification and cleanliness will result in anything 
contrary to being excluded.  Id. 
 16. Id. at 73 (“Place . . . always involves an appropriation and transformation of 
space and nature that is inseparable from the reproduction and transformation of soci-
ety in time and space.  As such, place is characterized by the uninterrupted flux of 
human practice – and experience thereof – in time and space.” (quoting Allan Pred, 
The Social Becomes the Spatial, the Spatial Becomes the Social: Enclosure, Social 
Change and the Becoming of Places in Skane, in SOCIAL RELATIONS AND SPATIAL 
STRUCTURES 337-65 (Derek Gregory & John Urry eds., 1985))). 
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about our collective values.  It may be the collective judgment to reject a par-
ticular use in a particular place that tells us the most about our social identity. 
Calabresi and Melamed’s iconic One View of the Cathedral,17 describes 
property decisions as those that advance individual ownership by preserving 
one’s power of marketable exclusion (property rules),18 shift individual own-
ership by implementing an objective damages rule (liability rules),19 or limit 
transfers through state action (inalienability rules).20  At the core of these 
rules is the conception of an entitlement – what Calabresi and Melamed de-
scribe as the state’s choice of which interest to prefer in the face of conflict.21  
But this conceptual framework is merely the extension of other broader prin-
ciples through forced means.22  That is, legal entitlements reflect perceptions 
of shared consensus for how a particular space should be used and who 
should get to decide.23  This shared consensus constitutes information about 
what society values, what it doesn’t value, and how it chooses to express 
those values. 
 
 17. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  
This Article refers to the classic Calabresi and Melamed article as “One View” be-
cause of the significant progeny of scholarship that their article created. 
 18. Id. at 1092.  Property rules are those that further the entitlement holder’s 
right to demand a price for shifting the entitlement to another person.  Id.  For exam-
ple, trespass is often treated as a property rule because it reinforces the right of the 
owner to demand a price (or no price at all) to allow a third party access to his proper-
ty.  See Jacques v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997) (enforc-
ing punitive damages for intentional trespass despite only actual nominal damages 
because of “society’s interest in preventing intentional trespass to land”). 
 19. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1092 (discussing how liability rules 
allow for an individual to destroy an entitlement by paying an objective price). 
 20. Id. at 1092-93 (discussing how inalienability rules prevent the transfer of a 
property entitlement through either property or liability rules). 
 21. Id. at 1090 (“[T]he fundamental thing that the law does is to decide which of 
the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail.”); see also id. at 1090 n.4 (“The use 
by the state of feelings of obligation and rules of morality as means of enforcing most 
entitlements is not only crucial but terribly efficient.”).  Calabresi and Melamed argue 
that without the state’s intervention, individuals could form their own rules to enti-
tlement (obligations), but their own conduct would be in conformity with their indi-
vidual agreements without any acknowledgement of a greater force (the state).  Id. at 
1090-91. 
 22. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1605 (1985). 
 23. The relation of state recognition of entitlements and the creation of power 
relationships through markets, legal constraints, and creation of social validity has 
long been recognized.  See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. 
REV. 465, 495 (1988) (reviewing  LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-
1960 (1986)) (“In the midst of every transaction sits the state, determining the relative 
bargaining power of the parties, and hence, to a large extent, the structure of ‘private’ 
relations.”). 
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Sometimes, that consensus conveys information that the space is re-
served for public use.24  For example, scholars have attempted to explain why 
the law recognizes public space in the face of systems that prefer private 
ownership.25  Within that sphere, groups seek to carve out their own identity 
against the backdrop of collective approval.  The presence of “informal 
norms,” the recognition of rules, and the choices to occupy one space over 
another reflect more broadly a collective choice to tolerate or not tolerate an 
individual or group’s occupation of a particular space.26  And sometimes, the 
consensus is found in the limitation of certain undesirable groups from ac-
cessing the public space.27 
This Article describes how space-claiming in both private and public 
spheres functions as a means of defining our collective identity.  In particular, 
how our choices to limit one claimant’s occupation or use of particular space 
imports a collective identity through rule recognition.  Rule recognition is the 
information that reflects one’s validity to use space.28  For example, homeless 
 
 24. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inher-
ently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 724 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, The 
Comedy of the Commons] (describing the development of public trust doctrines that 
protect the public access to property in the face of private ownership).  Carol Rose has 
described other ways in which property serves as a social ordering communication.  
See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 76 
(1985) (describing the role of possession as a “clear act” as a means of creating clear 
and supportable claims to space and things). 
 25. We build consensus for how space becomes public and what that means.  
Carol Rose has described the rationales underlying the creation of public space – the 
merging of commerce and togetherness.  She writes:  
[T]he public’s claim had to be superior to that of the private owner, because 
the propert[y] [itself was] most valuable when used by indefinite and unlim-
ited numbers of persons – by the public at large.  Publicness created the “rent” 
of the property, and public property doctrines – like police power doctrines – 
protected that publicly created rent from capture through private holdout.   
Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 24, at 774. 
 26. See generally Kettles, supra note 12. 
 27. See SIBLEY, supra note 15, at xiv (stating that certain state action might be 
“compared with many instances of exclusion where boundaries are drawn discretely 
between dominant and subordinate groups”).  Citing Mike Davis, Sibley describes 
how exclusion based on race, class, and wealth converge in the homeless streets of 
Los Angeles: 
Talking to a black, homeless man in downtown Los Angles, Davis comments: 
“In front of us, tens of thousands of poor people, homeless people; at back op-
ulence, affluence, Bunker Hill, the new L.A.”  He then asks: “could you walk 
up there?” and the man replies, “If they were to catch me in that building, they 
would have so much security on my ass, I would probably be in jail in five 
minutes.”  Again exclusion is felt acutely, but the homeless are rendered invis-
ible to the affluent downtown workers by the spatial separations of city centre 
development[,] which keep the underclass at a distance. 
Id. (citing MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE OF LOS ANGELES 
231 (1990)). 
 28. See Kettles, supra note 12, at 78-79. 
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persons may occupy territories according to hierarchies established by might 
and bargaining.29  But the lack of a legal entitlement to occupy the space 
leaves these individuals subject to society’s choice to no longer tolerate either 
their occupancy of certain space or the means by which they deny others the 
right to share the space.30 
Likewise, courts allow property owners freedom to use their property in 
whatever manner they may choose – until those expectations interfere with a 
different collective judgment for how far a property owner’s right should 
extend.31  Courts can stop the harmful acts, require compensation to continue 
the acts, approve of the acts with no compensation, or approve of the act sub-
ject to compensation.32  Courts may also decide that the property owner’s 
right can’t interfere with a different collective right.33  In all these instances, 
collective identity is reflected in the actions that courts and legislatures will 
tolerate in a particular space. 
Rule recognition (or choices of one entitlement over another) reflect col-
lective norms of the society and locality where applied.  Collective norm-
creation performs three primary functions for society: (1) it represents sec-
tional interests as universal interests; (2) it denies or transmutes contradic-
tions; and (3) it naturalizes or reifies existing social structures.34  This Article 
argues that these three strands of norm-creation appear in homelessness cases 
relating to control of space. 
First, space control tends to reflect collective expectations for space-use 
through both behavioral norms and formal rules that are respected or not re-
spected within that particular space.35  For example, in every setting there are 
behaviors that are condoned by the dominant culture of the space, and there 
 
 29. As described previously, they may indeed self-police or prescribe their own 
rules for resolving conflict in a certain space; they acknowledge informal rules that 
shape their occupancy of certain places; and they claim space in non-legal ways, seek-
ing validation for their occupancy of that space and demonstrating that validation by 
enforcing rules that exclude others from occupying the same space.  See BLOMLEY, 
UNSETTLING THE CITY, supra note 1, at 18-19 (noting the role of localism in shaping 
claims to territory and communal identity). 
 30. See, e.g., Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), in 
THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE, supra note 10, at 209-
10 (describing jurisdiction as a means of describing power relationships enforcing 
status on territory). 
 31. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1090 (“The entitlement to make 
noise versus the entitlement to have silence, the entitlement to pollute versus the enti-
tlement to breathe clean air, the entitlement to have children versus the entitlement to 
forbid them . . . .”). 
 32. See id. at 1090-92. 
 33. See id. at 1092-93. 
 34. ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION, 
STRUCTURE AND CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS 66-67 (1979). 
 35. See Kettles, supra note 12, at 51-53. 
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are behaviors that are not.36  Sometimes, the rules are formally applied, and, 
other times, the rules are merely acted upon by participants in the space, with 
no overt acknowledgement of the rules’ existence.37  When norms and behav-
iors that are associated with an area are conformed to, the individual becomes 
part of a group whose identity is linked to the geographic space they occu-
py.38  Much of this conforming happens informally and is usually acknowl-
edged only when a breach of the decorum becomes apparent.39  For example, 
in Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, protestors staged overnight demonstrations at 
Nashville’s War Memorial Plaza (the “Plaza”), which was under no stated 
curfew.40  The court said “the Old Rules permitted overnight use of the Plaza 
. . .” though the local government encouraged the passage of new rules “to 
reduce urination, defecation, and vandalism from homeless individuals who, 
at times, used the Plaza as a ‘sanctuary’ for overnight accommodation.”41  
The local government eventually passed new rules that limited Occupy Nash-
ville’s ability to remain in the Plaza overnight.42  This combination of formal 
rules (the curfew) and informal purpose (reducing homeless presence in the 
 
 36. For example, train commuters create private space in public by placing ob-
jects in seats, averting their gaze, or sitting in an outside aisle seat.  See Gary W. Ev-
ans & Richard E. Wener, Crowding and Personal Space Invasion on the Train: 
Please Don’t Make Me Sit in the Middle, 27 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 90, 91 (2007); Gary 
W. Evans, Design Implications of Spatial Research, in RESIDENTIAL CROWDING AND 
DESIGN 198 (John R. Aiello & Andrew Baum eds., 1979).  However, placing feet on 
seats is generally viewed as a social faux pas.  For example, in San Francisco, riders 
of the Bay Area Rail Transit set up a Facebook page to post pictures of rude behavior 
by other commuters.  See BART Idiot Hall of Fame, FACEBOOK, https://www.
facebook.com/groups/179216652183323/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).  In some locales, 
the no feet on the seats rule is more than just an informal norm, and actually is en-
forced by law enforcement.  See Ben Muessig, “No Feet on Seats” Rule Is in Effect 
on Trains – Even at 2:30 AM, GOTHAMIST (Dec. 27, 2009, 10:10 AM), http://goth-
amist.com/2009/12/27/no_feet_on_seats_rule_remains_in_ef.php. 
 37. See, e.g., Kettles, supra note 12, at 56, 60. 
 38. See id. at 62-63. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 784-85 (M.D. Tenn. 
2013) (denying, in part, summary judgment for government officials in a Section 
1983 action against the City of Nashville relating to enforcement at the Occupy 
Nashville site), rev’d, 796 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2014).  The Tennessee Department of 
General Services (“DGS”) did not amend the Old Rules in response to Metro’s urg-
ing.  Id.  “The defendants argue[d] that the DGS had legitimate reasons for not 
amending the rules as requested by Metro Nashville, particularly Metro Nashville’s 
request to permit it (as opposed to the state police) to enforce those rules on the Pla-
za.”  Id. at 786 n.7.  The court said, “Whatever the merits of this position, the relevant 
point is that the State was on notice of a ‘curfew gap’ in the Old Rules well before the 
Occupy Nashville protest took place in October 2011.”  Id.  “Here, the Old Rules in 
effect through October 27, 2011 permitted the plaintiffs to utilize the Plaza, which is a 
traditional public forum, for overnight free speech activity.”  Id. at 799. 
 41. Id. at 786. 
 42. Id. at 787-89. 
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Plaza) became infused when the identity of the occupy group shifted from 
protestor to public nuisance.  Thus, the occupants of the Plaza were aligned 
with the negative features of vandalism, public urination, indecent exposure, 
and the like through the import of a new rule and a broader collective judg-
ment on the space.43  In those cases, the offensive behavior is rarely catego-
rized as an offense to any one individual, but rather as an offense to the col-
lective, even if only a few people care.44 
Second, norms relating to space-use tend to obscure or confuse contra-
dictions that might otherwise be present were the norms not present.  For 
example, in Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, the plaintiff in an action to enjoin 
the removal of tents from the Occupy Oklahoma City site stated that “sleep-
ing tents constitute a visual representation of the group’s message; living in 
tents signifies poor and homeless people in a battle with Wall Street and gov-
ernment as a result of economic events, such as mortgage foreclosures and 
the financial crisis.”45  These visualizations were condoned and accepted so 
long as they were not actually representative of poor and homeless people, 
but rather were merely symbolic.46  But when Occupy Oklahoma City dis-
banded, leaving only homeless persons occupying the park space, the city 
quickly removed the tents, thus covering over the contradictory message.47 
 
 43. See id. at 786-87.  The court stated: 
Indeed, if the defendants actually understood the Old Rules to mean other-
wise, they would not have needed to adopt a new law to drive the protestors 
off of the Plaza at night.  Of course, the fact that the plaintiffs had a clearly es-
tablished First Amendment right to utilize the Plaza for their overnight speech 
activity does not mean that they could do so while violating existing laws of 
neutral application, such as laws against vandalism, public urination, indecent 
exposure, and the like.  Thus, for example, the plaintiffs could have been ar-
rested for urinating on the [P]laza or for vandalizing the Plaza by causing 
structural damage, breaking lights, etc. 
Id. at 799. 
 44. See GIDDENS, supra note 34, at 103 (“The level of normative integration of 
dominant groups within social systems may be a more important influence upon the 
overall continuity of those systems than how far the majority have ‘internalized’ the 
same value-standards.”). 
 45. No. CIV-11-1423-D, 2011 WL 6152852 , at *4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2011). 
 46. The notion of invisibility through condoned living structures was explored by 
Stephen Schnably in an article titled Property and Pragmatism.  See Stephen J. 
Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property and 
Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 378 (1993).  Schnably wrote: “Finally, when the 
home becomes a haven or refuge, privacy can mean invisibility; and the distance from 
the private home to the invisible homeless is not great.  Typically, anti-homeless 
legislation aims to keep the homeless out of public view or out of public spaces.”  Id.  
Noting that the spirit of most anti-homeless ordinances are aimed at keeping living 
“private” only adds to the “valorization of the private home as the exclusive area of 
personal growth and development.”  Id. at 379. 
 47. The court in Isbell recited the facts relating to the city’s decision to not renew 
the permit: 
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Lastly, space-claiming, when respected, solidifies the identity of those 
claiming the space through the physical occupation of the space and the 
means for which they choose to occupy it.48  At a certain point, the space is 
not only defined by the participants occupying it, but the space also begins to 
define the participants.49  Thus, homeless persons are those that occupy pub-
lic space without permanent housing.50  This observation was made by Robert 
Park when looking at the way groups interact in cities: 
It is in the urban environment – in a world that man himself has made 
– that mankind first achieved an intellectual life and acquired those 
characteristics which most distinguish him from the lower animals and 
from primitive man.  For the city and the urban environment represent 
man’s most consistent and on the whole, his most successful attempt 
to remake the world he lives in more to his heart’s desire.  But if the 
city is the world which man created, it is the world in which he is 
 
On November 28, 2011, a collective decision was made by responsible city 
officials, including Chief Citty and Mr. Berry, that Occupy OKC’s permit 
should not be renewed.  The decision was based on several factors.  Mr. Berry 
recommended that camping activity be stopped but daytime use of Kerr Park 
be allowed to continue, so long as park conditions and renovation plans al-
lowed.  Chief Citty was concerned that organizers of Occupy OKC were no 
longer staying in Kerr Park at night and could not be reached when problems 
arose; in his view, there was a lack of accountability for incidents that oc-
curred.  Tents erected by Occupy OKC were largely unoccupied and provided 
an open invitation for homeless persons unaffiliated with the group to stay 
there.  Police officers patrolling the area reported deteriorating conditions and 
a stench coming from the park.  Other concerns included complaints that the 
tents were obstructing the park, were discouraging others from using the park, 
and that the encampment was aesthetically damaging. 
2011 WL 6152852, at *6. 
 48. See NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 
30 (Michael Dear et al. eds., 1994) (“Every social collectivity . . . ‘includes two ideas, 
a people and its land, the first unthinkable without the other.’”) (quoting Ellen 
Churchill Semple, The Influences of Geographic Environment on Law, State, and 
Society, in 3 EVOLUTION OF LAW: FORMATIVE INFLUENCES OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 
216 (Albert Kocourek & John H. Wigmore eds., 1918)). 
 49. See id. 
 50. This is reflected in a number of statutory provisions.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 
11302 (a)(1)-(2) (2012) (“[A]n individual or family who lacks a fixed, regular, and 
adequate nighttime residence; . . . an individual or family with a primary nighttime 
residence that is a public or private place not designed for or ordinarily used as a 
regular sleeping accommodation for human beings . . . .”).  These descriptions of 
homelessness purport to define a homeless identity only by its most common attribute 
– the lack of permanent housing.  Sociologists have long understood these definitions 
to be over-inclusive and lacking in sufficient depth in order to truly understand who is 
homeless and why.  See DAVID A. SNOW & LEON ANDERSON, DOWN ON THEIR LUCK: 
A STUDY OF HOMELESS STREET PEOPLE 7-8 (1993) (describing at least three typolo-
gies for understanding homeless persons – residential, familial, and role-based digni-
ty). 
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henceforth condemned to live.  Thus, indirectly, and without any clear 
sense of the nature of his task, in making the city, man has remade 
himself.51 
Man’s most extensive creation of space is the city, where mankind at-
tempts to create a world closer to his own desires.52  Humans replicate this 
behavior in smaller spaces, seeking to forge their identities onto the smaller 
spaces they occupy.53  Collectively, these identities become forged together 
to identify the space by people’s behaviors, culture, and customs.  The ability 
to claim an identity based on occupancy of space has certain benefits.  Identi-
ty may lead to privileged access to scarce resources.54  Identity in space may 
be tied to intangible qualities, such as the preservation of cultural memory55 
 
 51. ROBERT PARK, The City as Social Laboratory, in HUMAN COMMUNITIES: THE 
CITY AND HUMAN ECOLOGY 73 (1952). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Various sociological, social geographies, and cultural histories have de-
scribed how space and identity merge in religious immigrant identity, see generally 
ROBERT A. ORSI, THE MADONNA OF 115TH STREET: FAITH AND COMMUNITY IN 
ITALIAN HARLEM, 1880-1950 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the relation of community 
identity to the shrine of the Madonna at 115th Street in Harlem); ROBERT A. ORSI, 
THANK YOU, ST. JUDE: WOMEN’S DEVOTION TO THE PATRON SAINT OF HOPELESS 
CAUSES (1996) (describing the relationship of Chicago immigrants to the Shrine of St. 
Jude); THOMAS A. TWEED, OUR LADY OF THE EXILE: DIASPORIC RELIGION AT A 
CUBAN CATHOLIC SHRINE IN MIAMI (1997), nudists at nude beaches, see generally 
CARELLIN BROOKS, WRECK BEACH (2007) (describing the particularized identity of 
Wreck Beach participants and the way their identity was shaped by the space); JACK 
A. DOUGLAS ET AL., THE NUDE BEACH (1977) (describing the role of geography in 
defining nude beach goers), Los Angelinos, see generally WILLIAM DAVID ESTRADA, 
THE LOS ANGELES PLAZA: SACRED AND CONTESTED SPACES (2008) (describing the 
convergence of immigrant and non-immigrant populations around the Los Angeles 
Plaza public space), and surfers, see generally PETER HELLER, KOOK: WHAT SURFING 
TAUGHT ME ABOUT LOVE, LIFE, AND CATCHING THE PERFECT WAVE (2010) (describ-
ing surfing culture and the tension between surfing tribes, localism, and other identity 
and geography intersections). 
 54. See, e.g., WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, 
AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 13-14 (1983) (comparing the property systems 
of early New England Colonists with Algonquian Indians of the Northeast as identifi-
ers of their political and ecological values); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 287-96 (Peter Laslett ed., 1967); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Is Land 
Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 
31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 246 (2004) (describing different rationales supporting proper-
ty rules in the western legal tradition). 
 55. See, e.g., U.S. on Behalf of Zuni Tribe of N.M. v. Platt, 730 F. Supp. 318 (D. 
Ariz. 1990).  In Platt, the defendant landowner, Platt, tried to prevent the Zuni Indian 
tribe from crossing his land. 
The Zuni Indians, as part of their religion, make a regular periodic pilgrimage 
at the time of the summer solstice, on foot or horseback, from their reservation 
in northwest New Mexico to the mountain area the tribe calls Kohlu/wala:wa 
which is located in northeast Arizona.  It is believed by the Zuni Indians that 
12
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or the instigation of creativity.56  And identity tied to space may be related to 
personal security. 
Part I of this Article draws on explanations of collective identity as a 
source for understanding how individuals interact with legal actions.  Part I 
defines collective identity similar to the Calabresi and Melamed’s notion of 
entitlement, incorporating the critical perspectives of power vis-à-vis property 
ownership and moral superiority as metrics for understanding when collective 
action happens.57  Part I argues that collective identities, specifically those 
that rely on the adoption of subjective understandings of identity, are particu-
larly prone to exclude underrepresented communities’ expectations of identi-
ty, such as homeless persons.58  Throughout Part I, homeless identities are 
referred to as a counter example to the dominant collective identity. 
Part II of the Article considers types of homelessness cases and their re-
lation to physical space.  Homeless legal disputes interact with physical space 
in three broad classes of cases.  One class is where the dispute relates to 
homeless occupation of public space – sleeping in public areas or leaving 
personal goods in public places.  The second class of cases relates to activi-
ties of homeless persons that impact public and private spaces – such as pub-
lic drunkenness, panhandling, recycling, and supposed moral hazards, such as 
public sex or public urination and defecation.  Finally, the third class of cases 
relate to the impact of properties that attract homeless persons on other prop-
erties.  Part II describes each of these categories of cases by illustrating vari-
ous approaches courts take to each type of dispute. 
Part III of the Article considers how these space-based homelessness 
cases relate to Calabresi and Melamed’s rule formulation to explain how 
identity emerges in those decisions.  In Part III, the Article articulates nui-
sance in the framework of Calabresi and Melamed’s entitlement shifting 
scheme – employing property rules, liability rules, and inalienability – focus-
ing primarily on property rules and inalienability.59  The Article argues that 
collective identity emerges as a latent value underlying decision makers’ 
 
Kohlu/wala:wa is their place of origin, the basis for their religious life, and the 
home of their dead. 
Id.  The court granted the Zuni Indians a prescriptive easement to cross Platt’s land.  
Id. at 324. 
 56. See generally Charles J. Ten Brink, Gayborhoods: Intersections of Land Use 
Regulation, Sexual Minorities, and the Creative Class, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789 
(2012) (describing the role of space and association that spurs creativity).  But proper-
ty does not always spur creativity.  See Sanford Levinson, Thomas Ruffin and the 
Politics of Public Honor: Political Change and “Creative Destruction” of Public 
Space, 87 N.C. L. REV. 673, 692-99 (2009) (describing the tendency towards creative 
destruction that property can create). 
 57. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1091. 
 58. See MARIANA VALVERDE, EVERYDAY LAW ON THE STREET: CITY 
GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 207 (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 
2012) (describing the tendency to leave out vulnerable populations from city govern-
ance matters). 
 59. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1091. 
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choices to apply a specific rule.  In homelessness cases, this often means that 
vested property interests are pitted against individual human interests.  Many 
times, homeless identity is rarely accounted for in legal decisions because 
homeless persons lack a source of legal relief outside of associating with uni-
versal claims.  On the other hand, property owners and space constituents 
often can assert their subjective expectations for collective identity through 
their control of space.  In these cases, the question is not whether the behavior 
is morally problematic, but rather to which identity the legislative, constitu-
tional, or legal protection extends. 
PART I: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN LEGAL ACTION 
Sociologists and legal scholars turn to collective identity as a way to ex-
plain resource mobilization and political process.60  In sociological literature, 
collective identity has been used to explain how actors in a social movement 
come to adopt a shared sense of the movement as a collective actor, despite 
having individual identities within the collective movement.61  In legal schol-
arship, collective identity means the overall identity of the state through its 
actions (through laws and ordinances), representing the community for whom 
it acts.62  Collective identity, in its legal sense, is undergirded by two primary 
concepts – deliberative democracy63 and entitlements.64  In both instances, 
collective identity becomes a way of explaining collective action even when 
some actors do not fit perfectly within the descriptions that support the identi-
ty.  In these cases, collective identity draws upon notions of dialogical crea-
tion and structural power to support the fiction of a collective whole. 
Collective identity at the governance level is often manifested through 
the corporate and social construction of state actors.65   Corporate identity is 
the collection of constituents governed.66  “Social identities are [the] sets of 
meanings that an actor attributes to [herself] while taking the perspective of 
others.”67  Imagine a public space in a large metropolitan area, containing a 
tourist attraction, a culturally significant public space, and a merchant plaza.  
If the homeless who also occupy this area are viewed as a threat to the other 
 
 60. Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1499-1500 (1988); 
see also Francesca Polletta & James M. Jasper, Collective Identity and Social Move-
ments, 27 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 283 (2001). 
 61. See Dorothy Holland et al., Social Movements and Collective Identity: A 
Decentered, Dialogic View, 81 ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 95 (2008); Polletta & Jasper, su-
pra note 60, at 285. 
 62. Michelman, supra note 60, at 1502, 1513-14. 
 63. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 
15 (2001). 
 64. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1091-92. 
 65. Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 
88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 384, 385 (1994). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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constituents’ use of the space, the other bodies that are vested in the collec-
tive identity surrounding the space (those formed by merchants and govern-
ing bodies) will reduce the role that homeless social identities play in the 
collective identity formation process.  This may happen because merchants 
and state actors will attribute a social identity of illegitimacy to the homeless.  
To the extent that homeless are given social identities in the governing pro-
cess, the identity is usually based on basic characteristics (i.e., lack of perma-
nent housing) or on identities governing bodies already identified as problems 
(i.e., drug users, nuisance, vagrants, gang members, etc.).68  Thus, homeless 
persons sit as those subjected to urban governance, but with little expressed 
identity in the legal and political process. 
In the sociological frame, much concern is laid towards the role that in-
dividual actors play in establishing their own identity and contributing to the 
collective identity of the movement they are a part of (origin).69  Sometimes, 
legal systems adopt the individual social identity that actors associate with 
themselves; sometimes, legal systems project a social identity on actors.70  
This leads to inexact, relational strains, such as disparities in treatment for 
legal claims based on nuisance as applied to property owners versus those 
deemed to be social problems.71  Legal claims for nuisance arising from envi-
ronmental harms are shaped by collective regulation of space; thus, the pres-
ence of a validating identity, such as property ownership, often becomes the 
most visible arm protecting a collective interest.72  This disparity reflects the 
reality that legal regulations depend on notions of authority and validity as 
touchstones of their enforceability. 
Some sources of both authority and validity are relationships and identi-
ties formed in the political and legal environment.73  Because “legal powers 
and legal knowledges appear . . . as always already distinguished by scale[,]” 
identity formation in space has the greatest impact on urban and local legal 
regulations.74  Most legal scholars tend to overlook individual identity, as-
suming that individual identity is fully expressed within either the bounds of 
the legal interest being protected75 or through the availability of the political 
process.76  Legal scholars, therefore, preferring a functionalist focus to prob-
 
 68. Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of 
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1186-87 
(1996). 
 69. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY 
IN THE LATE MODERN AGE 1-2 (1991). 
 70. See Polletta & Jasper, supra note 60, at 287. 
 71. Mariana Valverde, Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premod-
ern Ways of Seeing in Urban Governance, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 277, 291-92 (2011). 
 72. See id. at 294. 
 73. See id. at 287. 
 74. Mariana Valverde, Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal ‘Technicalities’ as Re-
sources for Theory, 18 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 139, 141 (2009). 
 75. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1094. 
 76. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 9-10. 
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lem-solving in disputed spaces, often overlook social identities that seeming-
ly challenge existing projected identities – such as property owners or eco-
nomic interests.77 
As Calabresi and Melamed describe it, choosing which side to favor 
amongst competing legal interests is a core function of resolving entitlement 
shifts; this is reflected in what has become known as the entitlement theory of 
legal enforcement where law decides which competing legal interests to fa-
vor.78  This deference to judgments based on “who is most deserving” reduc-
es valuations of individual identity to hierarchies of preference, often prefer-
ring established conventional interests, such as property ownership over indi-
vidual identity interests.  Likewise, notions of deliberative democratic79 pro-
cess suggest that the enforcement or abatement of entitlements through legal 
means is one that represents the view of the collective because individuals 
had access to participate in the political process.80  Importantly, both entitle-
ment theory and theories of deliberative democracy fail to take account of 
social identities that fall outside of legally enforceable interests, such as iden-
tities of the homeless.  Homeless persons’ lack of access to a recognizable 
legal entitlement to enforce claims to space along with their absence from the 
political process often gives urban and local governments license to treat 
homeless persons as problems to be governed from an authoritative perspec-
tive.81  The alternative, engaging in a relational problem-solving paradigm 
that takes account of differing identities, is abandoned or overlooked.82  It is 
precisely this failure to identify the foundation of land-use restrictions in ur-
ban spaces that has led to “crypto-functionalist tendenc[ies]” that purport to 
govern land-use but actually target vulnerable groups, such as the homeless.83 
 
 77. See, e.g., Valverde, supra note 71, at 279.  Functionalist legal views often 
prefer the realism of law on the ground as a means to an end.  As stated by Brian 
Tamanaha: 
Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, Felix Cohen, and other Legal Realists, as-
sumed a more radical stance than Pound, but on the instrumental view of law 
they were in complete agreement.  In Llewellyn’s characterization, the Legal 
Realists “view rules, they view law, as means to end.”  This was the “major 
tenet” of Legal Realism, supplemented by the insistence that law must be seen 
as it actually functions, not as an abstract body of rules, concepts and princi-
ples. 
Dr. Michael Wilkinson, Three Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence of 
Democratic Experimentalism, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 673, 687 (2010) (citing BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, THE PERILS OF PERVASIVE LEGAL INSTRUMENTALISM 28 (2005)). 
 78. Calabresi & Melamed supra note 17, at 1090. 
 79. Deliberative democracy is the phrase through which legal scholars describe 
the ends of democracy being the access to deliberation, not the outcomes or results 
from legal processes.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 6-8. 
 80. Id. at 7. 
 81. JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE 
THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 1-3 (1998). 
 82. Valverde, supra note 71, at 280-81. 
 83. Id. at 279. 
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The choice by urban governments to only recognize the most visible 
identity of homeless persons also deprives homeless persons of any meaning-
ful relational process to reconcile their identities with public space.  As has 
been explored in other areas, the law’s non-recognition of nuanced identity 
reduces access of individuals to legal and political remedies or rights.84  
Likewise, homeless persons have been deemed to be powerless problems for 
cities to respond to – not constituents to be heard.85  This lack of power also 
means that, in a relational construct, other interested entities in space will 
have better access to legal and political means than homeless persons.  The 
ways that certain constituents are able to influence government action stands 
in direct contrast to the powerlessness with which homeless persons are able 
to seek protections for their own interests.  Urban economic interests regular-
ly mobilize support to do something about the homeless problem.86  The mo-
bilization motive has been described by numerous observers of urban life and 
is a stalwart rationale for controlling street behavior that the collective deems 
undesirable.  Merchants and “citizens” urge government officials to take ac-
tion against chronic homelessness because of the economic drain on the mer-
chant community.87  For example, proponents of the broken windows hy-
pothesis often point to homelessness as a precursor to greater criminal 
tendencies for an area.88  This leads cities to create what William H. Whyte 
describes as the “defensive” city center, or one manufactured to deter unde-
sirables.89 
Indeed, merchants, residents, and other persons with economic interests 
promote political mobilization to create defensive hedges around the city 
center that treat homeless persons as a collective group, rather than by per-
sonal identifiers.90  Much of the animus around these defensive efforts is to-
wards eliminating visible signs of disorder to deter more serious crime.91  
 
 84. See, e.g., Marc S. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity: Visible Same-Sex 
Couples and the Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. OF CIVIL RTS. & SOC. 
JUST. 3, 68 (2008). 
 85. See Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law, supra note 10, at 16-17. 
 86. See, e.g., Associated Press, Homeless Ousted from a Skid Row, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 6, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/06/us/homeless-ousted-from-a-skid-
row.html. 
 87. See Polletta & Jasper, supra note 60, 283-84. 
 88. GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: 
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 12 (1998). 
 89. WILLIAM H. WHYTE, CITY: REDISCOVERING THE CENTER 156 (1988). 
 90. See, e.g., Paul Ades, The Unconstitutionality of “Antihomeless” Laws: Ordi-
nances Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to 
Travel, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 595-96 (1989); Dennis P. Culhane, Tackling Home-
lessness in Los Angeles’ Skid Row: The Role of Policing Strategies and the Spatial 
Deconcentration of Homelessness, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 851, 851-52 (2010). 
 91. Ellickson, supra note 68, at 1177-78; Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics 
and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2479 (1997) 
[hereinafter Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology]; Dan M. Kahan, Social Influ-
ence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (1997) [hereinafter 
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Often, these pressures lead to privatizing formerly public spaces and remov-
ing the “homeless problem” as the space begins to be shaped and reshaped by 
what the dominant collective power structure deems that social identity to 
be.92  What this often means is legislating and policing spaces based on group 
exclusion, rather than personal entitlement to occupy.93  Notably, this privati-
zation of public space is undergirded by government-created “property enti-
tlements” that give the authority in charge the power to exclude whomever 
they choose.94  As one author suggests, this privatization is more than a 
change in the delivery system of a public amenity: it reflects how open space 
is “redefined and reshaped in the context of changing socio-economic and 
political relationships.”95 
A.  Collective Identity in Legal and Sociological Terms 
1.  Establishing Social Identity Through Rule Creation 
Creating rules – particularly legal rules – reflects a conflation of identi-
ties, ideologies, and power-relationships.  When a city seeks to control a spe-
cific group of people, such as the homeless, the rules imposed reflect not only 
the city’s perception of the group identity, but also the city’s own identity, 
ideology, and its ability to carry out those rules. 
a.  Social Identity Creation 
The mere fact that persons external to a group categorize the group in 
some way suggests meaning is imposed on the group and on to persons asso-
ciated as a part of the group.96  Meanings are “linguistic categories that define 
 
Kahan, Social Influence]; Tracy L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law En-
forcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 212 (1998). 
 92. Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Privatization of Public Open Space: The Los 
Angeles Experience, 64 TOWN PLAN. REV. 139, 160 (1993). 
 93. Id. at 155. 
 94. Id. at 154. 
 95. Id. at 160. 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 154-55.  For example, consider Alice Braum and Donald 
Burne’s reaction to categorizing homeless persons as “poor persons”: 
By perpetuating the myth that the homeless are merely poor people in need of 
housing . . . advocates reinforce and promote the most pernicious stereotypes 
about poverty in America.  The vast majority of poor people in America are 
not homeless.  Poor people do not live on the streets, under bridges, or in 
parks; do not carry all of their belongings in shopping carts or plastic bags; do 
not wear layers of tattered clothing and pass out or sleep in doorways; do not 
urinate or defecate in public places; do not sleep in cars or in encampments; 
do not harass or intimidate others; do not ask for money on the streets; do not 
physically attack city workers and residents; and do not wander the streets 
shouting at visions and voices . . . . 
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the objects to which we are oriented and thus constitute our reality and influ-
ence our action towards those objects.”97  An important “meaning” imposed 
on groups is the creation of rules that are enforceable based on broad identifi-
ers.  Meanings necessarily incorporate the ideologies of the group conferring 
meaning and the rules by which those ideologies emerge.98  External group 
identity provides a convenient, though perhaps inaccurate, depiction of group 
norms for society.99 
b.  Ideology 
Inherent in collective norm-creation is the manifestation of ideology 
within collective groups through rule-creation and rule-following.100  As one 
group of researchers argues, “[A]ny study of ideology necessarily examines 
how symbolic orders sustain forms of domination and identifies ‘the basic 
structural elements which connect signification and legitimation in such a 
 
KELLING & COLES, supra note 88, at 65 (quoting ALICE S. BRAUM & DAVID W. 
BURNES, ANALYSES OF ISSUES IN JOYCE ET AL. V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
14 (1994)).  The intent to differentiate homeless persons from persons who are merely 
indigent suggests that these activities are ones that homeless persons by definition 
engage in.  See id. 
 97. JOHN LOFLAND ET AL., ANALYZING SOCIAL SETTINGS: A GUIDE TO 
QUALITATIVE OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS 132 (4th ed. 2006). 
 98. Id. at 132-33. 
 99. Id.  Sometimes, the identification of a person as homeless may be done to 
prejudice that person as to other persons.  See, e.g., People v. Chapman, No. 
A122393, 2010 WL 127595, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2010) (claiming prosecuto-
rial misconduct when prosecutor referenced Defendant’s status as homeless in front 
of the jury) (citing People v. Herring, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1066, 1074-75 (1993)).  The 
Chapman court clarified that the prosecutor in Herring had not actually referred to the 
defendant as “homeless.”  Id. at *7.  The court stated in a footnote: 
Actually, the word “homeless” was never used in the Herring opinion.  How-
ever, the defendant there was characterized by the prosecutor as “a parasite 
[who] never works,” which the Court of Appeal treated as clear misconduct 
because these remarks “had nothing to do with the crimes alleged and inferred 
that people who do not work . . . are bad people and more likely to do criminal 
acts.  This argument directed at appellant’s character invited the jury to decide 
the case based upon its own value judgment and not on the law.”  Neverthe-
less, it requires no great leap of imagination to discern how this argument 
could easily be adjusted to explicitly refer to a defendant who is homeless. 
Id. at *7 n.10 (internal citations omitted). 
 100. See Jonathan H. Turner, The Theory of Structuration, 91 AM. J. SOC. 969, 
972 (1986). 
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way as to favor dominant interests.’”101  In short, we learn what motivates the 
rule-makers by examining the rules and to whom the rules are targeted.102 
c.  Power Relationships 
An important feature of collective identity and group identification is 
the role of power relationships and how those relationships continue to define 
the members of different groups.  In any group dynamic, certain individuals 
and constituencies have power and others do not.103  How those with power 
interact with the powerless can be described as a duality between identity and 
the rules (or structures) that form the identity.104  For example, 
[p]ower is an important facet of the duality of structure.  Giddens 
maintained that individuals can carve out spaces of control in their 
daily interaction; however, their control is limited by ideological 
meaning formations.  Control, then, is not a monolithic, irresistible 
structure determining the actions of agents.  Individuals who are dis-
cursively conscious can defy the dominant ideology in various ways, 
including through the dialectic of control, or in Giddens’ words: “how 
the less powerful manage resources in such a way as to exert control 
over the most powerful in established power relationships.”105 
When laws are passed or enforced, they not only confer a meaning about 
the group at which the law is directed, but they also confer a meaning about 
the group who seeks to enforce the law.106  Law becomes a means for under-
standing the ideology of the “collective,” as law is the set of rules enforced by 
society.107  When laws are directed at a specific group, the homeless for ex-
ample, the ideology of the collective towards an identified group may be re-
vealed.108  Notably, it is not important or even relevant that not everyone 
shares the ideological views that certain laws import.  Instead, the nature of 
law as a byproduct of deliberative democratic tendencies suggests that law is 
 
 101. Lynn M. Harter et al., The Structuring of Invisibility Among the Hidden 
Homeless: The Politics of Space, Stigma, and Identity Construction, 33 J. APPLIED 
COMM. RES. 305, 308 (2005) (quoting GIDDENS, supra note 34, at 192). 
 102. See VIVIENNE JABRI, DISCOURSES ON VIOLENCE: CONFLICT ANALYSIS 
RECONSIDERED 70 (1996); see also Turner, supra note 100, at 972. 
 103. Jeffery W. Lucas & Amy R. Baxter, Power, Influence, and Diversity in Or-
ganizations, 639 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 49, 49-51 (2012). 
 104. Id. at 58; see also Turner, supra note 100, at 973. 
 105. Harter et al., supra note 101. 
 106. See Turner, supra note 100, at 972. 
 107. Ideologies often center on questions of how participants bring the scheme 
into play in defining or repairing some problematic topic or issue.  Thus, in the in-
stance of the homeless, we can understand a collective ideology by the methods and 
structures employed in facing the “homeless problem.”  See Ellickson, supra note 68, 
at 1177-78. 
 108. See id. 
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subject to power-relationships that have the capacity to influence and shape 
the law’s imposition on certain groups.109 
2.  Establishing Group Identity Through Rule-Enforcement 
There are two tangible examples of how this identity – ideology – power 
relationship dynamic plays out with homeless persons.  The first, and more 
common, is the tendency for local “economic interests” to mobilize support 
to “do something about the homeless problem.”110  The mobilization motive 
has been described by numerous observers of urban life and is a stalwart ra-
tionale for controlling street behavior the collective deems undesirable.111  At 
the urging of merchants and “citizens,” government officials are urged to take 
action against chronic homelessness because of the economic drain on the 
merchant community.112  For example, proponents of the broken window 
hypothesis often point to homelessness as a precursor to greater criminal 
tendencies for an area.113  This leads cities to create what William H. Whyte 
 
 109. Id.  For example Robert Ellickson writes in his article Controlling Chronic 
Misconduct in City Spaces that four interrelated reasons motivate collective action, 
which, though trivial to any one pedestrian, becomes severe in the collective: 
First because the annoying act occurs in a public place, it may affect hundreds 
or thousands of people per hour.  (Contrary to what some might assert, views 
of offensive street conduct cannot be avoided simply by turning one’s eyes.)  
Second, as hours blend into days and weeks, the total annoyance accumulates.  
Third, a prolonged street nuisance may trigger broken-windows syndrome.  
As time passes, unchecked street misconduct, like unerased graffiti and unre-
moved litter signals a lack of social control.  This encourages other users of 
the same space to misbehave, creates a general apprehension in pedestrians, 
and prompts defensive measures that may aggravate the appearance of disor-
der.  For example, designers of a downtown office building who anticipate 
bench squatting may place spikes in building ledges.  These spikes then serve 
as architectural embodiments of a social unraveling, accentuating the broken- 
windows signal.  Fourth, some chronic street offenders violate informal time 
limits.  In open-access public spaces suited to rapid turnover, norms require 
individual users to refrain from long-term stays that prevent others from exer-
cising their identical rights to the same space. 
Id. 
 110. See, e.g., Ades, supra note 90, at 595-96. 
 111. See, e.g., Andy Hobbs, Downtown Olympia: Taking Back the Streets, 
OLYMPIAN (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.theolympian.com/2014/09/28/3341617_dow-
ntown-olympia-taking-back-the.html?rh=1. 
 112. See Culhane, supra note 90, at 851. 
 113. See KELLING & COLES, supra note 88, at 12 (citing street begging in San 
Francisco as a reason citizens withdrew from streets); id. at 15 (noting one aspect of 
disorder is the obstruction of public spaces).  Kelling and Coles draw a distinction 
between homeless who choose to be homeless and those who are made homeless by 
other causes.  Id. at 65-66.  This distinction, however, does not reach some of the 
animus that might cause a homeless person to reasonably choose to live on the streets 
rather than in a shelter.  Why Some Homeless Choose the Streets Over Shelters, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Dec. 6, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/12/06/166666265/
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describes as the “defensive” city center or one manufactured to deter undesir-
ables: 
Out of an almost obsessive fear of their presence, civic leaders worry 
that if a place is made attractive to people it will be attractive to unde-
sirable people.  So it is made defensive.  There is to be no loitering . . . 
and . . . no eating, no sleeping.  So it is that benches are made too 
short to sleep on, that spikes are put on ledges . . . .114 
Indeed, merchants, residents, and other persons with economic interests 
tend to create a political mobilization to create defensive hedges around the 
city center.115  Much of the animus around these defensive efforts is the 
avoidance or remedying of “broken windows” syndrome – or the idea that 
eliminating visible signs of disorder deters more serious crime.116  Often, 
these pressures lead to privatizing formerly public spaces and removing the 
“homeless problem” as the space begins to be shaped and reshaped by what 
the dominant collective power structure deems that identity to be.117  As one 
 
why-some-homeless-choose-the-streets-over-shelters.  For example, choosing to live 
on the streets because the person believes the shelter is unsafe seems quite reasonable.  
Id.  It also does not account for the fact that most cities do not have sufficient re-
sources to provide all of the homeless in their area with overnight shelter.  Maria 
Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and its Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 1-2 (1996). 
 114. WHYTE, supra note 89, at 156. 
 115. See KELLING & COLES, supra note 88, at 13 (describing how Seattle residents 
filed an amicus brief in support of the city to support “restrictive ‘street civility laws’” 
including an ordinance making it illegal to sit or lie down on public streets in the 
downtown and neighborhood commercial areas from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m.); Ades, supra 
note 90, at 595 (citing Associated Press, supra note 86 (describing efforts on June 4, 
1987 to remove homeless individuals from streets spurred by local merchants and 
individuals)); Culhane, supra note 90, at 851 (noting the influence of shop keepers, 
local chambers of commerce, tourism officials, and their advocates in government to 
eliminate the appearance of homelessness in the modern American city). 
 116. The broken windows theory was proposed by sociologists James Q. Wilson 
and George Kelling.  See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: 
The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Mar. 1 1982, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/?
single_page=true.  Notably the broken windows theory has been accepted by a num-
ber of prominent legal scholars as supporting a need for collective action in cities.  
See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 68, at 1177-78; Kahan, Between Economics and Soci-
ology, supra note 91, at 2488; Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 91, at 369-70; 
Meares, supra note 91, at 191-92. 
 117. Loukaitou-Sideris, supra note 92, at 156.  Noting the trend towards privatiza-
tion, Loukaitou-Sideris writes: 
Downtown open-spaces, like these under discussion, can be found today in 
almost every North American city.  They are part of a city’s redevelopment 
efforts, which more often than not are based on a corporate centre’s strategy.  
Investment priorities are transforming the ageing core into the modern corpo-
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author suggests, this privatization is more than a change in the delivery sys-
tem of a public amenity: it reflects how open space is “redefined and re-
shaped in the context of changing socio-economic and political relation-
ships.”118 
A second example of this power-ideology dynamic is where homeless 
persons themselves are able to constitutionally challenge local attempts to 
remove them from the streets.119  Here the dynamic is fraught with the diffi-
cult burden of bringing a challenge on the facial constitutionality of land use 
controls aimed at them.  Constitutional remedies offer persons limited power 
since they are not specific to any one person or group of people.  Thus, even 
successful claims represent only marginal changes in policy.  As described in 
the next section, the social structure remains intact, continuing to enable and 
constrain action based on group definition.  This discourse leaves politically 
powerless individuals, such as the homeless, with few opportunities to chal-
lenge seemingly valid acts of the collective as long as they fall within the 
category of regulated persons.  Said differently, because homeless persons are 
not participants in defining their social identity, rules that target that social 
identity are difficult to challenge absent a basis for associating with a broader 
collective ethic, such as a constitutional claim. 
B.  How Space Exclusion Leads to Collective Identity 
Just as rule enforcement often relies on establishing group identity, rule 
enforcement also helps establish the identity of the enforcers.  In other words, 
the enforcement of rules that exclude homeless individuals from common 
spaces also serves as an identifier of the group on whose behalf the homeless 
are excluded. 
While safety and resource allocation might be the animating principles 
that lead homeless populations to claim one space over another, different 
animating principles are at play when homeless persons are excluded from 
certain areas.  Homeless populations are particularly vulnerable to a munici-
pal decision to alter the economic image of a particular space.  When city 
officials choose to alter the economic landscape of certain areas, homeless 
populations are seen as collective obstacles, not individual stakeholders.  In 
these scenarios, homeless populations are often dispersed to less concentrated 
 
rate image, with emphasis on commercialization rather than reindustrializa-
tion, and orientation toward financial/administrative services and luxury con-
sumption.  Genuine public spaces, whether parks, squares, playgrounds or rec-
reational facilities, have been consistently devalued as amenities and redefined 
as planning problems to be eliminated or privati[z]ed. 
Id. at 156-57. 
 118. Id. at 160. 
 119. See, e.g., Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of N.Y., 293 F.3d 570, 572 
(2d Cir. 2002). 
23
Roark: Homelessness at the Cathedral
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
76 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
areas.120  One primary means of doing so is by making the areas where home-
less tend to congregate less attractive by making valued resources harder to 
obtain.121  Sometimes this happens by increasing police enforcement of low-
level offenses against homeless persons.122  Sometimes this happens by re-
ducing the amount of available space for comfortable occupation.  This is the 
exclusionary effect on non-entitled space at work. 
Reclaiming public space from homeless persons highlights the expres-
sion of collective identity.  Sociologists and legal scholars identify two ani-
mating rationales underlying the reclaiming of space from homeless persons: 
purification123 and re-establishment of order.124 
Purification of public space from homeless persons is often described as 
removing persons who are viewed as carriers of disease or harbingers of 
criminal activity from an area.125  Collectively, communities draw distinc-
tions for uses of space that are either “salutary” or “noxious.”126  “Salutary 
[spaces include] those to which access is valued and which are generally wel-
comed in residential neighborhoods . . . [including] parks, ‘good’ schools, 
and libraries.”127  Noxious spaces are those that “by virtue of their attributes, 
design, function, and client population, generate actual and/or perceived 
 
 120. See, e.g., Daniel B. Wood, Los Angeles Aims To Conquer Homelessness, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 17, 2006), http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0417
/p02s01-ussc.html (describing plan by Los Angeles municipal authorities to open 
homeless shelters outside the “high[ly] visible” downtown area to outlying areas).  
Dispersing homeless populations on outlying areas received mixed scrutiny.  For 
example, Michale Touhey, Mayor Pro-Tem of the City of West Covina, one of the 
localities where one such shelter was planned said: “We think they are trying to force 
a giant center on us because they are not adequately taking care of their problem . . . .  
We are concerned with taking everyone else’s problem.”  Id.; see also Jean Calterone 
Williams, The Politics of Homelessness: Shelter Now and Political Protest, 58 POL. 
RES. Q. 497, 502 (2005) (noting the impact of an intentional relocation of homeless 
persons from the “easily accessible” city center to a place only accessible by bus). 
 121. See, e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Cal. 1995) (de-
scribing activities by law enforcement to drive the homeless away, including turning 
on the sprinklers in Central Park more often). 
 122. Deborah A. Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public 
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 556-57 
(1997).  Police enforcement of laws restricting or prohibiting activities like panhan-
dling, sleeping in streets and parks, and even public urination has likewise been the 
subject of critical scrutiny, at least to the extent that such enforcement seems aimed at 
banishing homeless populations, rather than at assisting neighborhoods in maintaining 
a sometimes tenuous sense of public order.  Id. 
 123. See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 
521 (2009). 
 124. See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 116. 
 125. See Zick, supra note 123, at 521-22 (describing efforts by municipalities to 
remove homeless communities as an “evolving Geography of Purification”). 
 126. Alan Burnett & Graham Moon, Community Opposition to Hostels for Single 
Homeless Men, 15 AREA 161, 161-62 (1983). 
 127. Id. 
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negative effects and are often the subject of community resentment and oppo-
sition.”128  For example, one study demonstrated that homeless shelters cater-
ing to single men have been subject to community disapproval by local 
neighbors who oppose placement of homeless shelters near their homes.129  
Some of the reasons provided for opposing the shelter included generic de-
scriptions of clientele as “‘degenerate’, ‘undesirable’, ‘a fraternity which in-
cludes alcoholics, drug addicts . . .’, ‘delinquents’ and ‘drunkards’”130 illumi-
nating fears of adverse consequences to the population.  As summarized by 
the researchers, “[O]bjectors argued that the type of person to be housed was 
not to the ‘betterment of the area or the safety of the residents.’”131 
The restriction of space occupation based on noxious activity is usually 
accomplished by a combination of criminal actions against the users and civil 
actions for public nuisance against individuals facilitating the use.  Robert 
Ellickson goes so far as to combine these two concepts, describing the notion 
of a chronic street nuisance as occurring when “a person regularly behaves in 
a public space in a way that annoys – but no more than annoys – most other 
users, and persists in doing so over a protracted period.”132  In this way, the 
chronic public nuisance is like the private nuisance in that the principal reme-
dy being sought when ordinances are enforced is the prevention of the behav-
ior.133  The difference, of course, is that public nuisance is usually enforced 
via criminal sanction, rather than through civil entitlement resolutions. 
Another basis for reclaiming space is the restoration of “order” as a col-
lective goal.  Order as an animating principle of exclusionary space may be 
more compelling to certain political and business leaders.  For example, some 
have argued that “the mere presence of street homeless in the public sphere 
has the effect of unraveling the social order, leading to an increase in crime 
 
 128. Id.; see also Nancy Wright, Not in Anyone’s Backyard: Ending the “Contest 
of Nonresponsibility” and Implementing Long-Term Solutions to Homelessness, 2 
GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 163, 164-65 (1995) (describing an American “compas-
sion fatigue” with the homeless problem as producing characterizations of homeless 
as “pathological predators who spoil downtown areas and threaten suburbia”). 
 129. Burnett & Moon, supra note 126, at 164. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
The amenity and safety of local residents was a theme of many letters.  Chil-
dren would be “molested,” “exposed to a bad example” and “at risk.”  (Sonia 
(aged 8) expressed her own fears: “I am frightened because Mummy told me 
that naughty men may soon move here and I will not be able to play outside.”)  
Guest house proprietors feared “alienated” visitors and [that the impact of the 
hostel] would be “fatal to trade.”  The lowering of property values was explic-
itly mentioned by six objectors, while others emphasized environmental pollu-
tion including “cider bottles everywhere” and disturbance on Sundays. 
Id. 
 132. Ellickson, supra note 68, at 1168-69. 
 133. See, e.g., Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2000) (hearing 
challenge to ordinance banning aggressive panhandling as a misdemeanor offense); 
L.A. Alliance for Survival v. City of L.A., 993 P.2d 334, 336, 365 (Cal. 2000) (same). 
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and thereby driving middle- and upper-class consumers out of downtown 
areas and into the suburbs.”134 
Yet, order is often a subjective conclusion underscored by subjective ra-
tionales.  For example, in 2003, six homeless persons sued the City of Los 
Angeles alleging that city ordinances criminalize certain natural human be-
haviors.135  In Jones v. City of Los Angeles, the court found portions of the 
ordinance unenforceable; importantly, it announced that the ordinance 
amounted to criminalizing the status of being homeless.136  The court said in 
Jones: 
The City and the dissent apparently believe that Appellants can avoid 
sitting, lying, and sleeping for days, weeks, or months at a time to 
comply with the City’s ordinance, as if human beings could remain in 
perpetual motion.  That being an impossibility, by criminalizing sit-
ting, lying, and sleeping, the City is in fact criminalizing Appellants’ 
status as homeless individuals.137 
In striking down portions of the ordinance, the court distinguished be-
tween things that were already criminal, such as public urination.138  Yet, the 
criminalization of loitering requires law enforcement officials to make 
“judgments about people’s criminal propensity.”139  As one scholar notes, 
“[Loitering acts] embody legislative [or judicial] predictions about the likeli-
 
 134. Donald Saelinger, Nowhere To Go: The Impacts of City Ordinances Crimi-
nalizing Homelessness, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 545, 553 (2006).  Kelling 
and Wilson state: 
Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a 
building is broken and is left unrepaired, all of the rest of the windows will 
soon be broken. . . . [One] unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one 
cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing. . . . We suggest that “un-
tended” behavior also leads to the breakdown of community controls. 
Kelling & Wilson, supra note 116 (emphasis added).  Notably, the broken windows 
theory seems to have some flaws.  For example, Dorothy Roberts points out that the 
broken windows theory does not necessarily correlate to other behaviors.  See Doro-
thy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 796-99 (1999). 
 135. Jones v. City of L.A., 444 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 136. Id.; see also Tanene Allison, Confronting the Myth of Choice: Homelessness 
and Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 253, 254 (2007) (“As 
a homeless individual I was suddenly viewed by default as representing what is 
wrong in society.  I had spent years working with children and youth, but when I sat 
on the steps of a school near the shelter, I was instantly seen as a threat, deserving a 
call to the local police.  If I sat in a park, I was not enjoying a sunrise (or, more realis-
tically, occupying the only place that I could at that hour), I was a threat to public 
comfort.”). 
 137. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136-37. 
 138. Id. at 1131-32. 
 139. Roberts, supra note 134, at 783. 
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hood that people engaged in certain activities, bearing certain characteristics, 
or belonging to certain groups will engage in criminal activity.”140  These 
subjective predictions inevitably tend to target minority or unpopular groups 
as inherently suspect, and infer a judgment of group identity that differs from 
the collective identity. 
Recently, other efforts have been implemented under the guise of restor-
ing order.  For example, in 2010, Los Angeles police issued an injunction 
against John Does – eighty known drug dealers and 300 others with any po-
tential connection around the Skid Row area.141  While local merchants and 
residents praised the effort as a means to clean up the area from a known 
criminal operation, critics suggested that the order used criminal activity as a 
guise to force homeless persons out of the area.142  This type of injunction has 
been employed in other areas where groups that contradict the city’s sense of 
propriety occupy public space.  Principally, gang injunctions have allowed 
police to use loose-fitting criteria to reclaim space in the name of order.143  
Such loose-fitting criteria validate beat officers’ guttural reaction to whether 
the officer believes someone has a propensity for criminal activity – not 
whether that person has actually committed a crime or deviated from other 
collectively enforceable norms.  As so called “John Doe” injunctions are 
aimed at homeless areas, the specter of criminalizing homelessness as a status 
– rather than actual criminal activity – becomes a mechanism for asserting a 
broad collective identity over a space under the guise of maintaining order.    
Sociologists have suggested that collective norm-creation performs three 
primary functions for society: (1) it represents sectional interests as universal 
interests; (2) it denies or transmutes contradictions; and (3) it naturalizes or 
reifies existing social structures.144  Ironically, one legal scholar has suggest-
ed that politicians, business leaders, and academics point to three correspond-
ing rationales for the enforcement of anti-nuisance laws aimed at the home-
less: “(1) to increase and maintain public safety; (2) to improve the image of 
the city for tourists, businesses, and other potential investors; and (3) to re-
flect the growing ‘compassion fatigue’ of the city’s middle- and upper-class 
inhabitants.”145  Indeed, these rationales for reclaiming space affirm sociolo-
gists’ observations – in reclaiming the space (i.e. excluding homeless from 
space), society undertakes norm-creating functions.  Society elevates certain 
sectional interests over others (in this case, the interests of homed-persons 
and merchants over homeless persons); it seeks to cover up the existence of 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. See, e.g., Kate Linthicum, Crackdown to Target L.A. Skid Row Drug Deal-
ers, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/07/local/la-me-
skidrow-drugs8-2010apr08. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Thomas Watkins, Injunction Would Bar Gang Members from Skid Row, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
04/07/injunction-would-bar-gang_n_528912.html. 
 144. GIDDENS, supra note 34, at 193-95. 
 145. Saelinger, supra note 134, at 553. 
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the homeless, denying or transmuting the seeming contradictions that the 
homeless represent to the accepted community image; and it communicates to 
citizens that homelessness and poverty fatigue is an acceptable attitude to-
wards the poor, naturalizing and reifying bias towards these citizens. 
In short, collective identity emerges as a natural outgrowth of control-
ling space.  In Part II, this Article considers how collective identity emerges 
in homelessness cases. 
PART II: THE VISIBLE YET LEGALLY INVISIBLE HOMELESS 
Homelessness cases relating to space can be divided into three broad 
categories of legal restraints – first, homeless use of public space; second, 
homeless activities impacting public and private space; and third, other prop-
erties that attract homeless persons’ impact on private space. 
A.  Homeless in Public Spaces 
Homeless persons occupy public spaces for a variety of reasons.  As Te-
resa Gowan described, homeless persons living around the San Francisco 
neighborhood known as the “Haight” were drawn towards the neighborhood 
by a variety of attractions: the availability of acid-based drugs, excellent so-
cial services, a critical mass of other homeless persons who provided protec-
tion from police action, and obscure yet accessible spaces that offered greater 
privacy than open areas.146  Parks, libraries, and sidewalks tend to be the con-
gregations of homeless persons, who, not welcomed in other spaces, seek 
shelter, comfort and quiet escapes. 
City ordinances that attempt to reclaim these areas draw on, as scholars 
David Snow and Leon Anderson observed, the residential dimension of 
homeless identity.147  As a descriptor, it is the broadest conceptualization of 
homelessness and lacks nuances that attempt to actually capture individual 
identity of homeless problems.148  City reclaiming of public spaces from 
homeless persons tend to relate to three broad categories: enforcement of 
anti-camping laws and other similar constraints in public places like parks, 
sidewalks, streets, and depots; enforcement of hygiene rules in public places; 
 
 146. TERESA GOWAN, HOBOS, HUSTLERS, AND BACKSLIDERS: HOMELESS IN SAN 
FRANCISCO 249-56 (2010). 
 147. See SNOW & ANDERSON, supra note 50, at 7; see also LORNA FOX, 
CONCEPTUALISING HOME: THEORIES, LAWS AND POLICIES 491-92 (2007) (describing 
privacy’s interaction in the home as a tension between the European Convention’s 
Article on Human Rights and property rights of the individual); SIBLEY, supra note 
15, at 78, 99 (noting that control of public spaces is largely targeted to reduce the 
visible signs of homelessness from public view). 
 148. SNOW & ANDERSON, supra note 50, at 7-8.  For example, identifying home-
less persons only by the residential dimension fails to capture other dimensions, such 
as the familial support dimension or the role-based dignity and moral worth dimen-
sion.  Id. 
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and seizure of homeless property under the guise of public health.  Important-
ly, these reclaiming ordinances focus on controlling the visual and other sen-
sual encounters with the residential dimension of homeless persons.  That is, 
these ordinances control how pervasively the public is confronted with where 
a person sleeps (anti-camping ordinances) and how extensions of the home-
less person’s identity must be dealt with in public places (rules relating to 
hygiene and personal property). 
1.  Trespass and Anti-Camping Ordinances as Protections of Property 
Cities regularly enact ordinances aimed at preventing homeless persons 
from sleeping in public spaces.149  These ordinances are premised on the local 
government interests in promoting aesthetics, preserving access, ensuring 
proper sanitation, and promoting public health.150  Jurisdictions have split on 
whether such ordinances interfere with homeless persons’ equal protection 
rights or Eighth Amendment rights.151  In general, the legal questions relating 
to anti-camping ordinances are whether city officials may proscribe limits on 
 
 149. Yamiche Alcindor, Cities’ Homeless Crackdown: Could It Be Compassion 
Fatigue?, USA TODAY (June 10, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/nation/story/2012-06-10/cities-crack-down-on-homeless/55479912/1 (stating 
that more than fifty cities in the U.S. have passed anti-camping ordinances). 
 150. See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2000); An-
derson v. City of Portland, No. CIV 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *1 (D. Or. 
July 31, 2009).  One court stated the purpose of the city’s anti-camping ordinance in 
significant detail: 
The streets and public areas within the city should be readily accessible and 
available to residents and the public at large.  The use of these areas for camp-
ing purposes or storage of personal property interferes with the rights of others 
to use the areas for which they were intended.  Such activity can constitute a 
public health and safety hazard which adversely impacts neighborhoods and 
commercial areas.  Camping on private property without the consent of the 
owner, proper sanitary measures and for other than a minimal duration ad-
versely affects private property rights as well as public health, safety, and wel-
fare of the city.  The purpose of this chapter is to maintain streets, parks and 
other public and private areas within the city in a clean, sanitary and accessi-
ble condition and to adequately protect the health, safety and public welfare of 
the community, while recognizing that, subject to reasonable conditions, 
camping and camp facilities associated with special events can be beneficial to 
the cultural and educational climate in the city.  Nothing in this chapter is in-
tended to interfere with otherwise lawful and ordinary uses of public or pri-
vate property. 
Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224-25 (E.D. Cal. 2009).  Other 
reasons cities cite for enacting an anti-camping ordinance have included the desire to 
force homeless persons into service centers and restricting public resources to home-
less persons with ties to the locality.  See Porto v. City of Laguna Beach, No. SACV 
12-00501-DOC, 2012 WL 3810475 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012). 
 151. See Sarah Gerry, Jones v. City of Los Angeles: A Moral Response to One 
City’s Attempt to Criminalize, Rather Than Confront, Its Homelessness Crisis, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 239, 240 (2007). 
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use of public space (a property rule oriented view) or whether homeless per-
sons have inalienable rights to be free from status-based sanctions or due 
process failures (an inalienable entitlement view). 
In City of Providence v. John Doe, the City of Providence sought a per-
manent injunction against “unknown defendants,” known as “John Does,” for 
trespassing on certain city-owned land.152  The complaint alleged that these 
unknown defendants153 were camping by erecting tents and other unknown 
structures without permission from the city.  The city also claimed that the 
encampment had “no clean water, no garbage facilities, no electricity, no 
sanitation or bathroom facilities.”154  The Rhode Island Superior Court grant-
ed the city’s injunction over the homeless defendants’ claim that the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.155  The homeless defendants alleged that 
the proper forum for resolving this dispute was the district court because 
Rhode Island General Law Section 8-8-3(a)(2) gave exclusive jurisdiction of 
“[a]ll actions between landlords and tenants . . . and all other actions for pos-
session of premises” to the district court.156  The court rejected the defend-
ants’ subject matter jurisdiction argument because the court held the “action 
sounded in nuisance and trespass and was not an action predicated on rights 
arising from a consent-based landlord-tenant relationship.”157  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court agreed, finding that the action was one primarily aris-
ing from trespass, not from a legal relationship between two vested property 
holders.158  Underlying the court’s jurisdictional analysis lay the fact that the 
 
 152. City of Providence v. Doe, 21 A.3d 315, 316-17 (R.I. 2011).  The complaint 
alleged that “the encampment consisted of ‘various tents, shelters and other struc-
tures’ set up without securing the permission of the City of Providence and in viola-
tion of [various] municipal ordinances . . . .”  Id. 
 153. The court described the members of the encampment as “part of a communi-
ty of likewise homeless individuals providing common support and security.  Mem-
bers of said community named the encampment ‘Camp Runamuck.’”  Id. at 317 n.1. 
 154. Id. at 317.  A similar matter involved the State of Florida Department of 
Transportation alleging that the City of Miami “created, allowed or facilitated the 
taking up of permanent residence by [homeless persons under the Miami Julia Tuttle 
Causeway Bridge], and that due to the lack of electricity or facilities for these resi-
dents, several violations of the City of Miami Code, as well as health risks, ha[d] 
resulted.”  Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Miami, 20 So. 3d 908, 909-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009).  The dwellings were described as “makeshift” and as a “shantytown.”  Id. 
at 910. 
 155. Doe, 21 A.3d at 317. 
 156. Id. at 317-18. 
 157. Id. at 317. 
 158. Id. at 318-19.  Defendants argued that the term “other” as used in the statute 
“plainly references any and all other actions for possession of premises not involving 
a landlord/tenant relationship between the parties . . . .”  Id. at 318 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected that theory suggesting that 
a plain reading of the landlord-tenant action inferred that the statute applied to only 
the landlord-tenant relationship.  Id. at 318-19. 
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city had the right to control the spaces that it possessed; and that homeless 
people had no property relationship that interacted with that space. 
Similarly, in Benson v. City of Chicago, a homeless person challenged 
the city’s anti-trespass ordinance after she was cited for sleeping in a chair at 
O’Hare International Airport.159  The court, after considering various consti-
tutional arguments towards vagueness, found that the trespass ordinance did 
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.160  
The court, citing a prior Ninth Circuit decision, Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 
stated, “Chicago does not prohibit sitting, lying or sleeping in any public 
place at any time and in any circumstances, but only requires that a person 
leave the property of another when notified to do so.”161  Like City of Provi-
dence, Benson represented a court’s consideration of the state as property 
holder – and found that the property right to exclude was valid, enforceable, 
and did not interfere with other rights.162 
In the absence of property relationships, homeless persons and advo-
cates have attempted to articulate a constitutional basis for invalidating city 
ordinances relating to camping.  These constitutional arguments stem from a 
variety of sources including equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 
constitutional arguments that homeless persons are deprived of due process in 
application of ordinances; and deprivation of constitutional liberties under 
different constitutional amendments.  Broadly conceived, cases can be divid-
ed into periods marked by two cases: Pottinger v. City of Miami and Jones v. 
City of Los Angeles.163 
The first real challenge to a city’s application of ordinances against 
homeless persons was the 1989 opinion in Pottinger v. City of Miami.164  The 
action, brought by several homeless persons, alleged several due process and 
constitutional violations by the City of Miami’s Police Department in en-
forcement of the ordinances.165  Specifically, the claimants alleged: (1) that 
the city violated their Eighth Amendment rights to be free of cruel and unu-
sual punishment; (2) that the city abused its use of official process to remove 
homeless persons from public view; (3) that the city violated the Fourth 
Amendment by engaging in pretextual arrests that amounted to unreasonable 
search and seizure; (4) that the city’s seizure of homeless possessions were 
unreasonable and violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) 
that the city’s arrest of homeless persons in carrying out essential life-
sustaining activities violated homeless rights to decisional autonomy and 
 
 159. Benson v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 1123, 2006 WL 2949521, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 12, 2006). 
 160. Id. at *2-3. 
 161. Id. at *3. 
 162. Id. at *2. 
 163. See Elizabeth M. M. O’Connor, Note, The Cruel and Unusual Criminaliza-
tion of Homelessness: Factoring Individual Accountability Into the Proportionality 
Principle, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 233, 256 (2007). 
 164. 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
 165. Id. at 1554. 
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privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (6) that the right to carry out 
life-sustaining activities is fundamental and entitled to Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment protections.166 
The district court, drawing on a Supreme Court case, Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, articulated that city ordinances that attacked homeless activities really 
were prohibitions against their status as homeless persons, not mere controls 
of public space.167  The court, in linking Robinson and others to homeless 
ordinances, wrote: 
In sum, class members rarely choose to be homeless.  They become 
homeless due to a variety of factors that are beyond their control.  In 
addition, plaintiffs do not have the choice, much less the luxury, of be-
ing in the privacy of their own homes.  Because of the unavailability 
of low-income housing or alternative shelter, plaintiffs have no choice 
but to conduct involuntary, life-sustaining activities in public places.  
The harmless conduct for which they are arrested is inseparable from 
their involuntary condition of being homeless.  Consequently, arrest-
ing homeless people for harmless acts they are forced to perform in 
 
 166. Id. at 1555.  In their complaint, the claimants alleged six counts: 
[1] that the ordinances under which the City arrests class members for engag-
ing in essential, life-sustaining activities – such as sleeping, eating, standing 
and congregating – are used by the City to punish homeless persons based on 
their involuntary homeless status in violation of the protection against cruel 
and unusual punishment found in the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution; . . . [2] that the City has used its legitimate arrest powers for the 
unlawful purpose of “pest control,” that is, “sanitizing” its streets by removing 
unsightly homeless individuals, which amounts to malicious abuse of process; 
. . . [3] that the arrests of homeless individuals are pretextual and amount to 
unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Consti-
tution; . . . [4] that the City’s seizures of plaintiffs’ property lack probable 
cause, are unreasonable and violate the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Florida 
Constitution; . . . [5] that the City’s arrests of homeless individuals for essen-
tial, life-sustaining activities violate their right to due process, privacy and de-
cisional autonomy in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution; 
and . . . [6] that the right of homeless persons publicly to engage in essential 
activities such as sleeping, eating, bathing and congregating is “fundamental” 
for purposes of equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution; that arresting the homeless infringes upon 
these fundamental rights and other fundamental rights, such as the right to 
travel, and burdens the homeless as a suspect class; and that the City has no 
compelling interest in making these arrests. 
Id. 
 167. Id. at 1562 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).  The court 
also pointed to other decisions that overturned “vagrancy laws” and laws that made it 
a crime to be unemployed.  Id. (citing Robinson, 370 U.S. 660; Wheeler v. Goodman, 
306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971); 
Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1965)). 
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public effectively punishes them for being homeless.  This effect is no 
different from the vagrancy ordinances which courts struck because 
they punished “innocent victims of misfortune” and made a crime of 
being “unemployed, without funds, and in a public place.” . . . There-
fore, just as application of the vagrancy ordinances to the displaced 
poor constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, . . . arresting the home-
less for harmless, involuntary, life-sustaining acts such as sleeping, 
sitting or eating in public is cruel and unusual.168 
This description of criminalizing the status of homelessness as a sec-
ondary effect to the ordinance ultimately swayed the court to enjoin the en-
forcement of ordinances against homeless persons in particular areas of the 
city. 
Despite Pottinger’s compelling rationale, many courts refused to follow 
Pottinger’s theory of status-based punishment.169  Instead, many courts held 
that city ordinances were facially neutral170 or that litigants lacked standing to 
challenge those ordinances.171  Other courts held that as applied, similar ordi-
nances represented no unreasonable interference with homeless persons’ 
rights of process, their constitutional rights, or equal protection rights under 
the law.172 
Homeless persons challenging city ordinances after Pottinger faced the 
difficulty of proving facts as extreme as Pottinger to show that a city’s ordi-
nances were facially problematic.  For example, in another district court opin-
ion, Roulette v. City of Seattle, the Western District of Washington held that 
similar ordinances did not violate homeless persons’ constitutional or due 
process rights because the ordinances were facially neutral and not targeted at 
“expel[ling] homeless persons.”173  The district court said the ordinance in 
Roulette, unlike in Pottinger, contained no legislative record suggesting that 
the city intended to enforce these ordinances as a way to expel homeless per-
sons.174  The court also noted that the city’s substantial interest in promoting 
the economic health of the city, its aesthetics, and access to downtown public 
areas warranted the imposition of limitations on homeless persons sitting and 
laying down on sidewalks before 9 p.m. and after 7 a.m.175  The Ninth Cir-
cuit, reviewing the district court opinion agreed, holding that the same ordi-
nances did not pose a threat to either the First Amendment right to expression 
 
 168. Id. at 1564 (citing Headley, 171 So. 2d at 370). 
 169. See, e.g., Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 
2012); Anderson v. City of Portland, No. Civ. No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, 
at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 2009). 
 170. See Joyce v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 846 F. Supp. 843, 858 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 171. See Davison v. City of Tucson, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996). 
 172. See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2000); Tobe v. 
City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995). 
 173. 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1448, 1450 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
 174. Id. at 1448. 
 175. Id. 
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or to the due process guarantees to homeless persons.176  Similarly, the 
Northern District of California went so far as to suggest that a San Francisco 
ordinance differed from the one in Pottinger because the aim was to assist 
homeless persons: 
the programs operated by Miami and San Francisco are not, as plain-
tiffs suggest, “virtually identical.”  In Pottinger, the court found the 
Eighth Amendment violated when the City punished “sleeping, eating 
and other innocent conduct.” . . . The court emphasized that “plaintiffs 
[had] not argued that the City should not be able to arrest them for 
public drunkenness or any type of conduct that might be harmful to 
themselves or to others.” . . . Similarly, the court in Tobe was exclu-
sively concerned with a “camping ordinance” limiting the permissible 
uses of public streets and areas.  In contrast to these measures, the Ma-
trix Program is addressed in large part at prohibiting such conduct 
which is unmistakably “harmful” to plaintiffs or others.177 
Courts following Pottinger tended to treat similar ordinances as facially 
neutral, absent proof (such as a legislative record) that the ordinances were 
specifically targeted towards homeless persons.178  This focus on legislative 
deference, absent evidence of specified targeting, allowed courts to avoid 
dealing with the question of secondary effects that city ordinances produced.  
Courts’ refusals to find that anti-camping ordinances created undue hurdles 
for those with no actual place to go suggest that homeless persons, even after 
Pottinger, were socially invisible yet targeted as social problems.179 
 
 176. Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 305-06 (9th Cir. 1996).  Though the 
majority declined to acknowledge Pottinger, the dissent noted the court’s finding in 
Pottinger that a municipality’s interest in promoting tourism and business and in 
developing downtown did not rise to the level of a compelling interest and at most 
presented a substantial interest.  Id. at 309 n.4. 
 177. Joyce v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 846 F. Supp. 843, 856 n.6 (1994). 
 178. See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1155 (Cal. 1995) (choosing 
not to create an inference of a due process violation based on the “necessity” of vio-
lating the anti-camping ordinances by those persons with no place to go).  But see Joel 
v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that “actual motiva-
tions of the enacting governmental body are entirely irrelevant . . . . The proper in-
quiry is concerned with the existence of a conceivably rational basis, not whether that 
basis was actually considered by the legislative body.”). 
 179. For example, many homeless persons who also were convicted of sexual 
crimes are not permitted in homeless shelters, thus finding themselves literally with 
no place to go, yet in daily violation of city anti-camping restraints.  See Robinson v. 
Flowers, No. 1:11-cv-24-MP-GRJ, 2012 WL 4088862, at *6 (N.D. Fla. May 23, 
2012) (hearing tort suit by a homeless man alleging false arrest against officer when 
detained after listing a homeless shelter as a permanent address, but since the home-
less man could not stay at the homeless shelter because he was a sex offender, he 
slept outside the shelter at nights); Commonwealth v. Wilgus, 40 A.3d 1201, 1208 
(Pa. 2012) (holding that homeless persons were not exempt from disclosing perma-
nent address as required for state sex offender registry); Poe v. Snyder, 834 F. Supp. 
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A second challenge homeless persons faced after Pottinger was that cit-
ies might leave citations issued under various ordinances unprosecuted.  This 
left homeless persons without standing to challenge ordinances that targeted 
homeless persons’ activities – such as camping.  For example, in Johnson v. 
City of Dallas, the district court found that Dallas city ordinances that prohib-
ited sleeping in public areas of the city “failed to pass constitutional mus-
ter”;180 like in Pottinger, the court found that the ordinances violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.181  
However, the Fifth Circuit overturned the district court stating that the cases 
failed to present a “case and controversy” under the standing requirements.182  
The court said: 
We have thoroughly examined the designated record on appeal.  
While we find that numerous tickets have been issued, we find no in-
dication that any Appellees have been convicted of violating the sleep-
ing in public ordinance.  “If none of the named plaintiffs purporting to 
represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with 
the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any 
member of the class.”183 
 
2d 721 (W.D. Mich. 2011) (hearing suit by homeless persons and non-profit shelters 
against state to prevent enforcement of sex offender registry restrictions, where plain-
tiffs filed their complaint after the death of a homeless sex offender who was forced 
to sleep outside because overnight shelter located within 1000 feet of a school denied 
him access and, additionally, two other plaintiffs had been issued written warnings by 
law enforcement to cease using shelters within 1000 feet of a school, but, on the basis 
of the evidence, court provided declaratory relief that homeless persons do not violate 
the Michigan Sex Offender Residential Restrictions when staying in an overnight 
shelter); Dye v. State, 943 N.E.2d 928, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (describing increased 
burden on homeless sex offenders in finding shelter due to residential restriction re-
quirements); State v. Dinkins, 794 N.W.2d 236, 241-42 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (de-
scribing state’s argument that state sex offender registry as applied to homeless per-
sons is reasonable: “The State counters that Dinkins, like everyone, knows that he 
must sleep somewhere, and WIS. STAT. § 301.45(2)(a)5 and (e)4 merely requires in-
carcerated sex offenders to identify and report the address or nearest address of the 
place where they plan to sleep at least ten days prior to their release – even if the 
place is a park bench or similar on-the-street location”); State v. Adams, 91 So. 3d 
724, 738-39 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that Alabama statute requiring homeless 
sex offenders to register their residences and sanctioning those that were homeless 
unconstitutionally criminalized their status as homeless persons); People v. Annin, 15 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 278, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); People v. North, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 337, 340 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 180. Johnson v. City of Dallas, Tex., 61 F.3d 442, 443 (5th Cir. 1995) 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 445. 
 183. Id. (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)). 
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Indeed, after Pottinger, cities found themselves able to obtain the effect 
of their anti-homeless ordinances without subjecting the ordinances to legal 
challenge.184    
These tactics of avoiding constitutional challenges seemed to come to a 
head in Jones v. City of Los Angeles.185  Jones, like Pottinger, challenged an 
ordinance providing that “[n]o person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon any 
street, sidewalk or other public way.”186  In Jones, the City of Los Angeles 
lacked sufficient shelter space to house all of the homeless persons that resid-
ed within the city, forcing persons to sleep on sidewalks, benches, and stair-
ways.187  The question the court confronted was whether the city could con-
tinue to enforce anti-camping ordinances, in light of the fact that homeless 
persons literally had no where to go.  Unlike prior courts, Jones turned the 
rhetorical war on the homeless on its head, shifting the conversation from 
choices of the “service resistant homeless” to choices of the city to enforce 
restraints, despite insufficient social service availability.  Jones did so by con-
fronting the two problems that courts wrestled with after Pottinger: standing 
and secondary effects.188 
First, the court disagreed with the city’s argument that homeless persons 
who had not been prosecuted under the city ordinance lacked standing.189  
The court held that the plaintiffs satisfied the case and controversy require-
ments because they were seeking an injunction for prospective injunctive 
relief.190  The majority wrote: “The plaintiff need only establish that there is a 
reasonable expectation that his conduct will recur, triggering the alleged 
 
 184. See, e.g., Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1344 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(describing a city policy in which the city avoided arresting homeless persons though 
they continued to disrupt their ordinary existence); State v. Sturch, 921 P.2d 1170, 
1180 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996). 
 185. Jones v. City of L.A., 444 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 186. Id. at 1123 (citing L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.18(d) (2005)).  A violation of 
the ordinance was punishable by a fine of up to $1000 and/or imprisonment of up to 
six months.  Id. (citing L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE §11.00 (2005)). 
 187. Id. at 1122-23 (citing U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON 
HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 101, 105 (2002)).  The court de-
scribed one comment from a city official noting that “the gap between the homeless 
population needing a shelter bed and the inventory of shelter beds is severely large.”  
Id. at 1122 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court also cited a news article 
quoting the Los Angeles Police Department chief who said, “If the behavior is aber-
rant, in the sense that it breaks the law, then there are city ordinances . . . you arrest 
them, prosecute them, and put them in jail.  And if they do it again, you arrest them, 
prosecute them, and put them in jail.  It’s that simple.”  Id. (quoting Cara Mia DiMas-
sa & Stuart Pfeifer, 2 Strategies on Policing Homeless, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2005), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/oct/06/local/me-dumping6). 
 188. Id. at 1126, 1137. 
 189. Id. at 1130. 
 190. Id. at 1127-30. 
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harm; he need not show that such recurrence is probable.”191  The court then 
noted: “Avoiding illegal conduct may be impossible when the underlying 
criminal statute is unconstitutional.”192  Looking to the facts of the homeless’ 
claims, the court said: 
Appellants have demonstrated both past injuries and real and immedi-
ate threat of future injury: namely, they have been and are likely to be 
fined, arrested, incarcerated, prosecuted, and/or convicted for involun-
tarily violating the [city anti-camping ordinance] at night in Skid Row.  
These law enforcement actions restrict Appellants’ personal liberty, 
deprive them of property, and cause them to suffer shame and stig-
ma.193 
The court also found that the ability to raise a necessity defense did not 
cure other effects of the ordinance’s enforcement – namely the loss of posses-
sions.194  The court held that plaintiffs had standing to sue for injunctive relief 
relating to violations of unconstitutional ordinances regardless of the city’s 
failure to prosecute.195  This allowed the court to get to the merits of the as-
applied constitutional claim, whereas previous courts never considered simi-
larly situated claims because of the procedural bar to homeless plaintiffs.196 
 
 191. Id. at 1127. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 1131.  The court in rejecting the possibility of raising a necessity de-
fense as a bar to standing noted that the defense may relieve homeless persons from 
culpability, but they “are unlikely to subject themselves to further jail time and a trial 
when they can plead guilty in return for a sentence of time served and immediate 
release.”  Id.  In addition, “[t]he loss of . . . possessions when they are arrested and 
held in custody is particularly injurious because they have so few resources and may 
find that everything they own has disappeared by the time they return to the street.”  
Id.  Risking raising a necessity defense would only further delay homeless persons’ 
release, making the chances of their property still existing upon release significantly 
lower.  See id. 
 195. Id. at 1130.  “[A]ll that is required for standing is some direct injury – for 
example, a deprivation of property, such as a fine, or a deprivation of liberty, such as 
an arrest – resulting from the plaintiff’s subjection to the criminal process due to vio-
lating the statute.”  Id. at 1129.  Citing other cases that permitted standing without 
conviction – Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco and two other similarly situ-
ated cases – the court suggested that the homeless had standing to bring claims for 
injuries without having suffered a conviction.  Id. at 1129 (citing Church v. City of 
Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 1994); Joyce v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 846 F. 
Supp. 843, 854 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 
1554 (S.D. Fla. 1992)). 
 196. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Dallas, Tex., 61 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that homeless persons had no standing because no conviction existed). 
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Having sidestepped the standing hurdle, Jones turned to whether the or-
dinances or their application passed constitutional muster.197  Like Pottinger, 
the Jones court focused on the role of status as described by earlier Supreme 
Court cases Powell and Robinson.198  But, unlike Pottinger, the court focused 
its attention on the involuntary circumstances of becoming homeless rather 
than the affirmative actions of the city.199  The court described how condi-
tions of becoming homeless may have occurred “innocently or involuntarily,” 
leading to the chronic condition of being forced to sleep on the streets of Skid 
Row.200  The court wrote: 
Whether sitting, lying, and sleeping are defined as acts or conditions, 
they are universal and unavoidable consequences of being human.  It 
is undisputed that, for homeless individuals in Skid Row who have no 
access to private spaces, these acts can only be done in public. . . . 
Appellants have made a substantial showing that they are “unable to 
stay off the streets on the night[s] in question.”201 
The Jones majority sided with the Powell dissenters and Justice White, 
holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishing individuals for in-
voluntary acts or conditions directly tied to one’s status – such as sleeping on 
the streets.202  The court then more explicitly pointed out the limitation of its 
 
 197. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1148-49. 
 198. Id. at 1132-37.  In Robinson, the Supreme Court considered a statute that 
criminalized an addiction.  Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).  Jones 
says about Robinson, “At a minimum, Robinson establishes that the state may not 
criminalize ‘being’; that is, the state may not punish a person for who he is, independ-
ent of anything he has done.”  Jones, 444 F.3d at 1133.  In  Powell v. Texas, the court 
considered whether Robinson should be extended.  392 U.S. 514, 521 (1968).  Powell 
involved a man who suffered from alcoholism and was charged with violating a stat-
ute that made it a crime to be drunk in a public place.  Id. at 517.  Both cases consid-
ered the effect of criminal sanctions as to the status of a person.  The four dissenting 
judges in Powell stated that “[c]riminal penalties may not be inflicted on a person for 
being in a condition he is powerless to change.”  Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 199. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136-37.  The court stated that a person “may become 
homeless based on factors both within and beyond his immediate control, especially 
in consideration of the composition of the homeless as a group . . . . That [they] may 
obtain shelter on some nights and may eventually escape from homelessness does not 
render their status at the time of arrest any less worthy of protection than a drug ad-
dict’s or an alcoholic’s.”  Id. at 1137. 
 200. Id. at 1136. 
 201. Id. at 1136. 
 202. Id.  “[T]he conduct at issue here is involuntary and inseparable from status – 
they are one and the same, given that human beings are biologically compelled to rest, 
whether by sitting, lying, or sleeping.”  Id.  “The cases the dissent cites do not control 
our reading of Robinson and Powell where, as here, an Eighth Amendment challenge 
concerns the involuntariness of a criminalized act or condition inseparable from sta-
tus.”  Id.  “[B]y criminalizing sitting, lying, and sleeping, the City is in fact criminal-
izing Appellants’ status as homeless individuals.”  Id. at 1137. 
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holding – that “so long as there is a greater number of homeless individuals in 
Los Angeles than the number of available beds, the City may not enforce [its 
anti-camping ordinance] . . . against homeless individuals for involuntarily 
sitting, lying, and sleeping in public.”203 
Courts after Jones would continue to assert that homeless persons 
lacked standing to challenge city ordinances where there was no clear prose-
cution.  For example, a Central District of California case, Porto v. City of 
Laguna Beach, considered claims arising from citations issued to homeless 
persons for sleeping in public.204  The plaintiff argued that placing conditions 
on homeless persons’ ability to stay in the city’s homeless shelter (such as 
prohibitions on possessions) made application of the no-sleeping-in-public 
ordinance unconstitutional.205  Distinguishing the issue of standing in Jones 
(and later decisions) the court said, “[P]laintiffs suffered meaningful injuries 
under the ordinances, such as arrest, jail time, fines, or property loss while 
under arrest.”206  The court further stated that he had “not . . . yet suffered any 
tangible harm related to the anti-camping ordinance; rather he allege[d] only 
that he [had] been warned against violating the ordinance and that he is fear-
ful he will be cited under it.”207  The court found that two warnings by police 
without citations also did not “demonstrate a ‘real and immediate’ risk of 
citation or other injury” which would give rise to prospective injunctive relief 
– such as in Jones.208 
But it was the last limitation asserted by Jones that would have the 
greatest impact on homelessness cases to follow.  The Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
in Jones demonstrated an as-applied failure of the city’s ordinances when 
directed towards homeless persons.  The combination of a deficiency of shel-
ter space, with the court’s view that many homeless persons were homeless 
“innocently or involuntarily,” meant that homeless persons were being crimi-
nalized by virtue of status with no means of avoiding the criminal sanction.209  
But by predicating its holding on the city’s responsiveness to the homeless 
problem (i.e., by providing adequate shelter for the homeless population), 
Jones created avenues for future courts to uphold city ordinances by distin-
 
 203. Id. at 1138. 
 204. Porto v. City of Laguna Beach, No. SACV 12-00501-DOC, 2012 WL 
3810475, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012). 
 205. Id. at *1.  In Porto, the plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of the city 
homeless shelter policies arguing that they required “guests to sign a liability waiver 
and demonstrate residency in Laguna Beach . . . .”  Id. 
 206. Id. at *7. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id.  In Jones, homeless persons were prevented from, “at all times and places 
. . . involuntarily sitting, lying, and sleeping in public.”  Jones v. City of L.A., 444 
F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).  The Jones 
court found that “[a]ppellants are entitled at a minimum to a narrowly tailored injunc-
tion against the City’s enforcement” of the statute preventing a person from sitting, 
lying, or sleeping in public.  Id. 
 209. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136. 
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guishing itself from Jones.210  Thus, like cases that followed Pottinger, where 
courts distinguished city actions by comparing city motives against the City 
of Miami’s targeting intent – courts began to distinguish Jones by pointing 
out that when the city’s stock of homeless shelter space is greater than the 
number of homeless persons, there would be no constitutional violation. 
For example, in Bell v. City of Boise, the District Court of Idaho held 
that the Boise Police Department’s choice to not enforce the city ordinance 
when the shelters were full meant that the ordinance did not constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment.211  The Special Order stated, 
“[O]fficers have discretion to enforce camping/sleeping in public or-
dinances except when, [1] Person is on public property and [2] There 
is no available overnight shelter.” . . . To ensure that officers know 
when shelters are full, shelter personnel agreed to call the Boise Police 
Department around 11 p.m. if the shelter is full. . . . The Boise State 
University Dispatch office, which has a contract with the Boise Police 
Department for law enforcement services at the university, then dis-
tributes the information via Department-wide e-mail and records the 
information. . . . Thus, the Boise police officers who would otherwise 
enforce the Camping and Sleeping Ordinances are directed not to do 
so when shelter space is unavailable, and the City has devised a way 
to obtain this information directly from the shelters.212 
Other courts considered whether the availability of shelter inventory 
meant that enforcement of a no-sleeping and anti-camping ordinance crimi-
 
 210. See, e.g., Benson v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 1123, 2006 WL 2949521, at 
*2-3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2006) (distinguishing the Jones opinion’s severity by pointing 
out that Chicago did not prohibit sleeping, sitting or lying under all circumstances). 
 211. Bell v. City of Boise, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1111-12 (D. Idaho 2011) 
(“[T]he Eighth Amendment Claims are mooted in part and otherwise fail as a matter 
of law: the undisputed facts reflect that the homeless may sleep in the parks during 
the day (whether or not shelter space is available) and may sleep in the parks at night 
in the event shelter space is unavailable.”), rev’d, 709 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 212. Id. at 1111-12; see also Bell, 709 F.3d at 901 (holding that the adoption of a 
special order rather than a legislative policy did not render the city policy moot in 
regard to plaintiff’s suit for prospective relief).  The district court also described 
“available overnight shelter” as: 
“a public or private shelter, with an available overnight space, open to an indi-
vidual or family unit experiencing homelessness at no charge.  To qualify as 
available, the space must take into account sex, marital and familial status, and 
disabilities.” . . . The Special Order further explains that otherwise available 
shelter space is not considered available to a particular individual if it “is not 
suitable to meet the individual’s disability needs, or the individual has exceed-
ed the maximum allowable stay [at the shelter].” . . . This individual exception 
expressly excludes “voluntary actions such as intoxication, drug use or unruly 
behavior.” . . . The Special Order also clarifies that “sleeping in a public park 
during park hours is not prohibited.” 
Bell, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1111. 
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nalized status, with mixed results.213  For example, in Catron v. City of St. 
Petersburg, the city unsuccessfully argued that the presence of inventory 
meant that the application of a no-sleeping ordinance was constitutionally 
valid.214  But these arguments seemed to run into obstacles in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, where, as in other circuits, courts embraced the available inventory ar-
gument as valid city theory.215 
And even in the Ninth Circuit, courts found room to disagree with the 
Jones view that a lack of inventory equated to an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion.  In Lehr v. City of Sacramento, the plaintiffs alleged that, like in Jones, 
the vast majority of homeless people on the streets at any given time 
have neither a legal place to go nor sufficient resources to obtain one.  
This is allegedly true absent any decisions they might make over 
whatever resources they do control, except perhaps in the very long 
term and with the assistance of multiple programs or institutions.  
While no generalization can adequately describe the diverse popula-
tion of homeless people in Sacramento, most of these individuals and 
families are poor, and without resources to pay for stable housing.  A 
large percentage are disabled, either physically or mentally, and, in 
addition, have problems with substance abuse.216 
Yet despite the similarities between Jones and the plaintiffs in Lehr, the 
Eastern District of California declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s earlier 
view, on the basis that the judgment was vacated as part of a settlement with 
the city.217  Noting the pervasive problems that homelessness presents, the 
 
 213. Courts before Jones noted that the lack of shelter inventory created strains on 
the city’s ability to enforce anti-camping ordinances.  See, e.g., Kincaid v. City of 
Fresno, No. 1:06-cv-1445 OWW SMS, 2006 WL 3542732, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 
2006). 
 214. See Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, No. 8:09-cv-923-T-23EAJ, 2009 WL 
3837789, at *3 n.6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2009) (citing presence of internal ordinance 
application memos as evidence of ordinance’s sufficiency): 
The memoranda advise an officer to educate the individual that is observed 
sleeping “in the right of way” about the ordinance and “‘afford the [individu-
al] the opportunity to voluntarily comply . . . by vacating the right of way.’” . . 
. The memoranda further advise that if no shelter space exists an officer 
should not charge the individual with a violation of the ordinance. 
Id. 
 215. See, e.g., Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1272 (11th Cir. 
2011). 
 216. Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1222 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 217. Id. at 1231.  “[A]s a threshold matter, the Court notes that, not only was the 
Jones decision subsequently vacated, it was issued by a panel split 2-1, and was ac-
companied by a powerful dissent.”  Id. at 1227.  “The parties have filed a joint motion 
informing us that they have settled this action and seeking dismissal of the appeal, 
remand, and withdrawal of our opinion . . . .”  Jones v. City of L.A., 505 F.3d 1006 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
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court declined to expand the horizons of the Eighth Amendment.218  Instead, 
the court held that the Supreme Court constrained a status based punishment 
theory to those cases that involve conduct that society has no interest in pre-
venting.219  In the court’s view, the Lehr ordinances targeted conduct, not 
status.220 
After Pottinger and Jones, courts found safe harbors in both the proce-
dural limitations and the substantive distinctions of city actions.  Standing 
continued to bar plaintiffs from bringing claims while allowing cities to con-
tinue enforcement and receive the effect of enforcement.  After Pottinger, the 
limitation was expressed by the failure to show “prosecution,” despite suffer-
ing the effect of the citation.221  After Jones the limitation was expressed by 
suggesting that the “injury” was not as severe as the one that gave rise to 
standing in Jones, or that plaintiffs didn’t lose property, were not arrested, or 
cited.222  Similarly, courts also found safe harbors by pointing to the fact that 
the city action in their cases was not as severe as the action in either Jones or 
Pottinger.223  That is, as long as cities did not create legislative records show-
ing an intent to treat the status of homeless persons differently, or as long as 
the total inventory of empty beds was greater than the number of homeless 
persons in the city, ordinances survived constitutional challenges despite 
criminalizing the status of being homeless.224 
2.  Hygiene Ordinances and Rules as Means of Excluding Homeless 
Persons 
A second category of public area restraints against homeless persons in-
volves so-called hygiene ordinances.  Like the anti-camping ordinances in 
public places, the hygiene-based provisions pitted homeless persons’ consti-
tutional rights to access a particular place against the state’s choice to enforce 
limitations on those rights, primarily in a First Amendment and equal protec-
tion context.  Unlike the anti-camping ordinances, the hygiene cases present-
ed the question of when a subjective interpretation of seemingly neutral rules 
are enforceable and when they are not.  Arguably, the cases present two types 
 
 218. Lehr, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1231. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 1231-32. 
 221. See discussion supra notes 189-196 and accompanying text (citing Johnson 
v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 
1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994)); see also State v. Sturch, 921 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
 222. See, e.g., Lehr, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1227, 1235 (rejecting plaintiffs’ standing 
as a status-based class). 
 223. See discussion supra notes 184-220 and accompanying text. 
 224. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Boise, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107-08 (D. Idaho 
2011), rev’d, 709 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2013); Anderson v. City of Portland, No. Civ. 
09-1447-AA, 2011 WL 6130598, at *2 (D. Or. Dec. 7, 2011). 
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of subjective valuations – one that is enforceable in the clothing of objective 
rule-making, and one that is not. 
In Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morrison, the Third Cir-
cuit considered the enforcement of code of conduct rules enforced by the 
local public library against a homeless patron.225  Specifically, a homeless 
man was expelled from the library under the auspices of the following provi-
sions in the library’s code of conduct: 
1. Patrons shall be engaged in normal activities associated with the use 
of a public library while in the building.  Patrons not engaged in read-
ing, studying, or using library materials may be asked to leave the 
building. Loitering will not be tolerated. 
. . . 
9. Patron dress and personal hygiene shall conform to the standard of 
the community for public places.  This shall include the repair or 
cleanliness of garments.226 
After being expelled, the New Jersey office of the American Civil Lib-
erties Union sent a letter to the Morristown Library, indicating several provi-
sions were violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because they were vague.227  The ACLU pointed to provisions relating 
to annoying behavior as being “constitutionally infirm.”228  It also alleged 
that provisions prohibiting loitering were too imprecise.229  The ACLU also 
suggested that the rule allowing the exclusions of patrons based on “personal 
dress and hygiene [that did not] conform to the ‘community standards’” was 
“equally offensive.”230  Lastly, the ACLU pointed out that these provisions 
were vague in their enforcement because they allowed library officials to use 
their own discretion for interpretation of whether the rules had been violat-
ed.231 
In response to the ACLU’s letter, the library’s board amended the rules, 
specifically Rule Nine, to provide: “[p]atrons shall not be permitted to enter 
the building without a shirt or other covering of their upper bodies or without 
shoes or other footwear.  Patrons whose bodily hygiene is offensive so as to 
constitute a nuisance to other persons shall be required to leave the build-
ing.”232  The ACLU communicated a continued displeasure with the hygiene 
 
 225. 958 F.2d 1242, 1246 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 226. Id. at 1247. 
 227. Id. at 1247-48. 
 228. Id. at 1248. 
 229. Id. at 1247-48. 
 230. Id. at 1248. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id.  The Board also changed Rules One and Five, as well as two unnumbered 
paragraphs following Rule Nine.  Id.  Rule One was changed from asking those who 
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rules because the discretion afforded library staff “will result in discriminato-
ry treatment of the homeless by virtue of their status.”233  Subsequently, 
Richard Kreimer was expelled from the premises for failure to comply with 
the hygiene requirements.234 
Kreimer brought suit against the library, alleging the rules were “vague 
and overbroad, both on their face and as applied by library employees, in 
violation of the plaintiffs [sic] rights under the First Amendment and plain-
tiff’s right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution,” as well as a violation of equal protection.235  
The equal protection claim asserted that plaintiff could not meet the library’s 
“subjective (and vague) standards . . . because of [his] homeless status or 
because of an involuntary physical condition.”236  In response, the library 
 
were not engaged in library activities to leave the building to requiring that those who 
were not engaged in library activities to leave the building.  Id.  Rule Five’s amend-
ment resulted in stronger language and more specifics.  Id.  A person could not “har-
ass or annoy” others; in the previous Rule Five, the word “harass” was absent.  Id.  In 
addition, a person could not stare or follow another person “with the intent to annoy 
that person . . . .”  Id.  The amended Rule Five included that a person could not sing 
or talk in monologues or “behav[e] in a manner which reasonably [could] be expected 
to disturb,” whereas before, a person could not sing or talk to oneself or behave in a 
way that would result in disturbance.  Id.  This amendment resulted in the requirement 
that a person had to have a reasonable expectation that his or her behavior would 
disturb others, a subjective factor that was determined by the audience.  Id.  In addi-
tion to the Rule Nine amendment, the Rule also stated, “Any patron not abiding by 
these or other rules and regulations of the library shall be asked to leave the library 
premises.  Library employees shall contact the Morristown Police if deemed advisa-
ble.”  Id.  In other words, the library was declaring its intent to contact police.  Id.  
Also, the rules stated that “[a]ny patron who violate[d] the Library rules and regula-
tions shall be denied the privilege of access to the Library by the Library Board of 
Trustees, on recommendation of the Library Director.”  Id.  The library had the au-
thority, under this amendment to the rules, to ban a person from entering the library.  
Id. 
 233. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Kreimer’s 
original complaint was filed pro se for “pain and suffering, emotional distress, humil-
iation, negligence, violation of . . . civil rights to enter a public building, [F]irst 
[A]mendment rights violations, harassment, defamation of character, and discrimina-
tion because of [his] homeless status” as a result of being banished from the library.  
Id. at 1248-49 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Kreimer then amended his com-
plaint to include more defendants: the Morristown Chief of Police, the President of 
the library, and the Morristown Business Administrator.  Id. at 1249.  Kreimer filed 
another amendment to include more defendants, including the former and then-
current mayors of Morristown, the then-current mayor and business administrator of 
Morris Township, another police officer, two library employees, and the President of 
the Board.  Id.  Approximately four months later, appointed counsel for Kreimer filed 
an additional and final complaint, which is quoted in the text of this Article.  Id. 
 236. Id. 
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filed a counter claim that sought an injunction against Kreimer from entering 
the library or harassing patrons.237  The district court found in favor of 
Kreimer’s motion for summary judgment against the library.238  The district 
court ruled that Rules One and Nine were null on their face, and enjoined the 
library from enforcing the rules.239  The Third Circuit on review reversed, 
finding no violation of due process in the rules.240 
After finding that the First Amendment encompasses a right to access 
information at a public library, the Third Circuit turned to consider the facial 
and applied validity of the rules in question.241   The court decided the library 
was a limited public forum and then considered whether the rules in question 
were facially problematic or applied in an unconstitutional way.242 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1249-50.  The library counterclaimed and asked “the court [to] issue an 
order ‘restraining and enjoining [Kreimer] from entering . . . [the Library and] . . . 
restraining and enjoining . . . Kreimer from harassing the patrons and employees of 
the Library in or about the Library premises including the sidewalks and streets abut-
ting the Library,’” and also for attorney’s fees and costs.  Id. at 1249 (alterations in 
original).  Then the library filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment that 
would declare the library rules valid, while Kreimer sought to dismiss the counter-
claim and summary judgment declaring the rules invalid under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.  Id. at 1249-50.  The District Court ruled for Kreimer, holding 
the rules “null and void.”  Id. at 1250 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 239. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 765 F. Supp. 181, 197-
98 (D.N.J. 1991), rev’d, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).  The court held that the rules 
were subject to First Amendment analysis due to their restrictions of access to “public 
reading material.”  Id. at 186.  The court reasoned that “[t]he policy does not condi-
tion exclusion [of persons] upon an actual or imminent disruption or disturbance as a 
result of [annoying] behavior or hygiene, and hence, the policy does not reasonably 
effectuate its stated goal of preserving the good order of the library.”  Id. at 189.  The 
court further noted that the last two paragraphs of Rule Nine were not narrowly tai-
lored and, therefore, violated the First Amendment.  Id.  The court found the rules 
“[did] not provide for alternative channels of communication” to those who did not 
have access to the library, holding that both Rules One and Five violated the First 
Amendment and were overly broad.  Id.  Finally, the court found that Rule Nine was 
vague as it was “especially susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”  
Id. at 194. 
 240. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1270-71. 
 241. Id. at 1255. 
 242. Id. at 1250, 1259.  The court first determined the “nature of the forum, be-
cause the extent to which the Government may limit access depends on whether the 
forum is public or nonpublic.”  Id. at 1255 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. 
& Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985)).  This court analyzed this issue by 
using the forum analysis from Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Association.  Id. at 1255-56 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)).  The Perry Court found three different classes of gov-
ernment fora for evaluating the existence of First Amendment protections: (1) places 
that traditionally have been a forum for assembly and debate, (2) public property that 
is a place for “expressive activity,” and (3) nonpublic places where the government 
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As a facial matter, the court said Rule Nine’s hygiene limitation was 
sufficiently narrow to promote the significant government interest of ensuring 
that “all patrons of the [Library] [can] use its facilities to the maximum extent 
possible during its regularly scheduled hours.”243  On whether this rule creat-
ed a disparate treatment of homeless individuals, the court said: 
While the district court was probably correct that the rule may dispro-
portionately affect the homeless who have limited access to bathing 
facilities, this fact is irrelevant to a facial challenge and further would 
not justify permitting a would-be patron, with hygiene so offensive 
that it constitutes a nuisance, to force other patrons to leave the Li-
brary, or to inhibit Library employees from performing their duties.  
Moreover, we do not face the more difficult scenario in which one in-
dividual possesses First Amendment rights and others do not.  Here, if 
the First Amendment protects the right to reasonable access to a public 
library, as we hold it does, this is a right shared equally by all resi-
dents of Morristown and Morris Township. . . .  Kreimer’s right has no 
lesser, or greater, significance than that of other residents.  According-
 
can enact time, place, and manner restrictions as long as the restriction is reasonable 
and not intended “to suppress expression.”  Id. at 1255 (quoting Perry, 473 U.S. at 
45-46).  The court found, in the context of Perry, that “[i]t is clear to us that a public 
library . . . is sufficiently dissimilar to a public park, sidewalk or street that it cannot 
reasonably be deemed to constitute a traditional public forum.”  Id. at 1256.  The 
court went on to determine if the library is a designated public forum by analyzing the 
traditional test and the modern developments through Supreme Court decisions of 
similar cases.  Id. at 1256-59 (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Madison Joint 
Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n., 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Se. Promotions, 
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)).  The court found that the library is a type of 
designated public forum, a limited public forum, which leads to analyzing the gov-
ernment intent of the library space, the extent of use, and the nature of the space.  Id. 
at 1259-61.  The fact that the library is open to the public does not avail the library to 
all First Amendment activities.  Id. at 1261 n.21.  Therefore, the court limited its rul-
ing, finding “the Library is obligated only to permit the public to exercise rights that 
are consistent with the nature of the Library and consistent with the government’s 
intent in designating the Library as a public forum.”  Id. at 1262. 
 243. Id. at 1264 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  When 
determining whether Rule Nine was narrowly tailored, the court noted that the rule 
does not have to be the “‘least-restrictive or least-intrusive means,’ of furthering the 
government’s interest.”  Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 
(1989)).  The court found that Rule Nine was narrowly tailored and advanced the 
library’s interest in requiring “non-offensive bodily hygiene” to prevent disturbing 
another person’s “use and enjoyment of the Library;” the rule did so while also pro-
moting the interest of “maintaining [the library’s] facilities in a sanitary and attractive 
condition.”  Id. 
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ly, his right to reasonable access to the Library cannot be expanded to 
such an extent that it denies others the same guarantee.244 
Similarly, the court dismissed the proposition that the rule failed to meet 
constitutional muster due to vagueness concerns: 
Although we agree that the “nuisance” standard contained in this rule 
is broad, in our view it is necessarily so, for it would be impossible to 
list all the various factual predicates of a nuisance.  As Professor Tribe 
has noted, “in any particular area, the legislature confronts a dilemma: 
to draft with narrow particularity is to risk nullification by easy inva-
sion of the legislative purpose; to draft with great generality is to risk 
ensnarement of the innocent in a net designed for others.” . . .  In this 
case, however, the rule’s broad sweep is not synonymous with vague-
ness.  The determination of whether a given patron’s hygiene consti-
tutes a “nuisance” involves an objective reasonableness test, not an 
annoyance test.245 
Considering the equal protection claim, the court declined to find that 
the rules imposed any legally significant burden on homeless persons.  The 
court said: “Further, in any event, as the homeless do not constitute a suspect 
class, the rules need only survive the lowest standard of review for equal pro-
tection purposes.  Our previous discussion forecloses any serious contention 
that they do not pass muster under this standard.”246 
Importantly, Kreimer’s application of the library’s hygiene standard 
passed constitutional muster because it drew upon a supposed objective 
standard – when a patron’s presence constituted a “nuisance” under New 
Jersey law.247  That nuisance standard allowed the library to attach its objec-
tive determinations of nuisance to any particular patron’s subjective discom-
fort due to the presence of a homeless person.248 
 
 244. Id. at 1264-65. 
 245. Id. at 1268.  Similarly, the court also dismissed the proposition that Rule Five 
and Rule One were vague.  Id. at 1267-68.  The court found that the subjective por-
tion of the “annoyance test” was overcome by Rule Five’s listing of specific behavior 
that is annoying (that of staring at or following another person), therefore, Rule Five 
was not vague.  Id. at 1268.  Likewise, Rule One was not found to be unconstitution-
ally vague, because the rule provided notice to library users that they were required to 
make use of the library activities in order to be able to remain in the library.  Id. at 
1267.  The library officials were accorded a certain amount of deference to eject those 
who were not engaging in library activities (quiet contemplation is included as a li-
brary activity).  Id.  Justice White recognized the discretion that library officials had 
by noting that a library could proscribe “loafing” or other library activities that are not 
“normal.”  Id. at 1267 n.33 (citing Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 150-51 (1966) 
(White, J., concurring)). 
 246. Id. at 1269 n.36. 
 247. Id. at 1269-70. 
 248. Id. at 1268. 
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Nearly ten years later, a similar case involving a homeless patron being 
expelled from a public library came before the District of Columbia District 
Court.  In Armstrong v. District of Columbia Public Library, the plaintiff was 
expelled from the Martin Luther King Public Library for failure to pass the 
appearance standards promulgated by the library.249  The plaintiff tried to 
enter the library “wearing a shirt, shoes, pants, several sweaters, and two win-
ter jackets to stave off the cold weather.”250  When the plaintiff attempted to 
enter the library, he was turned away by a security guard who told plaintiff 
that he needed to “clean up” before entering the building.251 
Unlike in Kreimer, the court in Armstrong found that the regulation 
went beyond the application of an objective nuisance test, defined as “unduly 
[interfering] with the exercise of the common right.”252  Specifically, the lack 
of a legal standard or a specific definition of “objectionable appearance,” 
called for the exercise of a subjective interpretation of the objectionable char-
acteristics.253  The court noted that the lack of specific objective standards for 
 
 249. The library maintained a policy that provided for the exclusion of patrons 
based on “[o]bjectionable appearance (barefooted, bare-chested, body odor, filthy 
clothing, etc.) . . . .”  154 F. Supp. 2d 67, 70 n.2 (D.D.C. 2001).  The policy was orig-
inally promulgated with a title which included the phrase “Loiterers and Vagrants.”  
Id. at 70.  That phrase was deleted in 1982, though the substance of the policy re-
mained unchanged.  Id.  As the court noted, the policy was passed because “a prolif-
eration of more street people and more homeless’ in 1979 ‘precipitated the need for 
[the] policy.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 250. Id.  Bundling clothing is a common homeless strategy that serves numerous 
functions.  First, it is a protection against the weather elements, as the plaintiff in 
Armstrong indicated.  Id.  Second, clothing can serve as a type of “armor” against 
violent attacks.  See A Primer on Homeless Behavior, STATESMAN (July 31, 2010, 
10:35 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local/a-primer-on-homeless-
behavior/nRwjf/.  Third, bundling clothing helps ensure that homeless persons will 
not lose items of property because they are left unattended – specifically clothing that 
is essential to stave off winter elements.  See Kevin Bundy, Note, “Officer, Where’s 
My Stuff?”, 1 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 57, 68-69 (2003). 
 251. Armstrong, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 70. 
 252. Id. at 77-79. 
 253. Id. at 77-78.  The court noted there are many examples of how the subjective 
interpretation of the “objectionable appearance” bar to the library was difficult to 
apply and often left the library security guards consistently questioning whether or not 
to bar someone from the library.  Id. at 78.  The chief of security at the library stated 
that, “no training and no written materials are available to the guards or other person-
nel to instruct them how to apply the regulation,” and in attempting to apply the regu-
lation, the security guards often had to “contact Mr. Williams or other supervisors, 
only to be instructed to apply the appearance provision based not simply on its plain 
language, but in accordance with the way Mr. Williams personally intend[ed] that the 
regulation be applied.”  Id.  Mr. Williams admitted that he could not describe over 
phone or radio whether or not a person was barred based upon a description from the 
guards.  Id.  Mr. Williams went further to state that “when he [could not] respond to 
the calls . . . the D.C. Metropolitan police, who [were] also not trained in interpreting 
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defining exclusion criteria caused the regulation to fail for vagueness.254  In 
short, the rules in Kreimer represented objective determination of “offensive 
behavior” because library employees merely enforced other patrons’ subjec-
tive expectations, while Armstrong represented the public library employee’s 
subjective judgment alone.255  Thus, like in so many other instances of legal 
interactions involving homeless persons, even so-called “objective determina-
tions” are based on someone’s subjective judgment. 
3.  Seizure of Homeless Property 
In addition to the question of whether homeless persons can occupy a 
public place, another question has come under scrutiny in various courts: 
whether homeless persons’ possessions may exist in a public space.  Cities 
have seized homeless persons’ possessions left in public under various theo-
ries, such as cleaning the streets from environmental harms,256 guarding 
against criminal activity,257 or acting as a guardian for abandoned items in 
order to return personal property to the right owner.258 
Early cases considering the seizure of homeless property tended to navi-
gate between the city’s responsibility as finder of personal property and its 
obligations not to carry out unreasonable searches and seizures under the 
Fourth Amendment.  For example, in Joyce v. City and County of San Fran-
 
or applying the barring regulation, [were] often called to assist the Library personnel 
in applying the regulation.”  Id. 
 254. Id.  In comparing this case to Kreimer, the court noted that this regulation 
“necessarily falls short of the objective standard required to survive a vagueness chal-
lenge,” because unlike Kreimer, there was no “cognizable legal definition to clarify 
exactly what appearances, or degrees of filth and odor are meant to be prohibited.”  
Id. 
 255. Id.; see also Lu v. Hulme, No. CA 12-11117-MLW, 2013 WL 1331028, at 
*5 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2013).  In Lu v. Hulme, the homeless plaintiff was excluded 
from the Boston Public Library under a policy that forbade patrons from “bringing 
non-assistive ‘wheeled devices’ into the Library, including ‘shopping carts,’ as well 
as ‘garbage, articles with a foul odor, or articles which, alone or in their aggregate, 
impede the use of the library by other users.’”  Lu, 2013 WL 1331028, at *2.  Plaintiff 
alleged in his complaint that the library personnel instructed plaintiff that “homeless 
people cannot come in with belongings.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Later the director of the library conveyed that “there had been ‘a homeless guy, who 
could not come in with his belongings [who] later found two suitcases and put every-
thing in the suitcases.  We then allowed him to come in with the suitcases.’”  Id.  The 
district court found that the plaintiff demonstrated a plausible as-applied challenge to 
the library policy, without having to evaluate the content of the policy.  Id. at *7. 
 256. See, e.g., Love v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 0396, 1998 WL 60804, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 1998). 
 257. See, e.g., Justin v. City of L.A., No. CV0012352LGBAIJX, 2000 WL 
1808426, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2000); Joyce v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 846 F. Supp. 
843, 847, 863-64 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 258. See, e.g., Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 863-64. 
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cisco, the plaintiffs alleged (and the court agreed) that the police department 
failed to comply with either state law or police department procedures when 
confiscating and destroying found property.259  However, the district court 
refused to grant the plaintiffs’ injunction because the city recently enacted 
new policies for the retention of found or abandoned property in public are-
as.260 
Some courts found that procedural bars prevented homeless persons 
from articulating a claim for injunctive relief against the seizure of personal 
property.  In Lehr v. City of Sacramento, the court dismissed the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims of all homeless persons who had not alleged 
that they actually had property confiscated by the city.261  In other cases 
though, the mere prospect that a seizure and destruction of property occurred 
was a valid basis to allow homeless plaintiffs to proceed in making their 
 
 259. Id. at 863. 
 260. The court described the city’s arguments as follows: 
The City argue[d] that, while the law protect[ed] unabandoned property left in 
public places, neither state nor local laws protect[ed] abandoned property.  
The City argues the distinction between abandoned and unabandoned property 
involves a “difficult determination,” and that in order to insure that unaban-
doned property is stored and held for possible return to its owner, “the City re-
cently has promulgated policies to address this issue.”  Specifically, the City 
cites the practice of the Department of Public Works which directs that prop-
erty of value found in encampment or other public places is to be bagged, 
tagged and held at a dispatch office for its owner within ninety days. 
Id. at 863-64. 
 261. 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1235-36 (E.D. Cal. 2009).  The court agreed with 
defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs had not “allege[d] or attempt[ed] to show that 
any of the individual Defendants ever confiscated their property,” therefore, the plain-
tiffs had no evidence and no standing for the violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights.  Id.  The court continued, stating, “The entities in this case 
claim to suffer injury by way of the confiscation of Plaintiffs’ property because these 
entities task themselves with replacing those items.  That injury is simply too attenu-
ated, not to mention voluntarily inflicted, to suffice to establish standing here.”  Id. at 
1235 n.7. 
  The Lehr court explicitly rejected the Jones v. City of Los Angeles majority’s 
analysis of the Eighth Amendment, stating that its rationale was “tenuous at best.”  Id. 
at 1231.  “[D]espite any similarities between Jones and the instant case, this Court is 
not now bound by the majority’s rationale and cannot today accept its logic.  Rather, 
this Court finds the Jones dissent to be the more persuasive and well-reasoned opin-
ion.”  Id.  The court continued, stating that upholding the Eighth Amendment claim 
would require “the existence of some form of mens rea [as] a constitutional prerequi-
site to a criminal conviction . . . [and the court] finds such a holding, even to the ex-
tent it may have followed from Jones, to be contrary to both the spirit and the letter of 
the law.”  Id. at 1234.  “It would potentially provide constitutional recourse to anyone 
convicted on the basis of conduct derivative of a condition he is allegedly ‘powerless 
to change[.]’ . . . A decision in favor of Plaintiffs today would be dangerous bordering 
on irresponsible.”  Id.  The court found that the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims 
failed as a matter of law.  Id. 
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case.262  In Justin v. City of Los Angeles, the court noted that homeless per-
sons in the Skid Row area have a “known practice of leaving possessions 
momentarily” and the known high “value they place on the few possessions 
they do have” is sufficient to warrant continuation of the case despite the fact 
they may have failed to identify possessions seized or identities of city offi-
cials who seized their property.263 
A city’s seizure of personal property of homeless persons has received 
the most scrutiny when the seizure violates a substantive due process right.  
For example, two recent cases each found that homeless plaintiffs stated 
claims for relief from seizures that violated plaintiffs’ due process rights re-
lating to life and property.  In Sanchez v. City of Fresno, the Eastern District 
of California found that homeless plaintiffs adequately stated a claim for re-
lief when city sweeps by the City of Fresno destroyed temporary homeless 
shelters in known encampments.264  Citing the “danger creation” liability 
doctrine, the court held that the city could be liable for “creating or exposing 
 
 262. Justin, 2000 WL 1808426, at *9. 
 263. Id. at *10.  See also Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1573 
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that the “property of homeless individuals is due no less 
protection under the [F]ourth [A]mendment than that of the rest of society”).  The 
Court in Pottinger allowed plaintiffs to present evidence of belongings seized by the 
police and the forced abandonment of possessions by homeless persons.  Id.  The 
court also found that the city’s interest in having clean parks was outweighed by the 
interests of the homeless plaintiffs in their belongings.  Id. 
 264. 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2012).  This is not the first case in the city 
of Fresno involving the seizure and destruction of homeless persons’ property.  See 
Kincaid v. City of Fresno, 244 F.R.D. 597 (E.D. Cal. 2007).  In Kincaid, after a class 
action lawsuit was filed against the city, the parties agreed to a settlement on the eve 
of the trial.  See Kincaid v. City of Fresno, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL. 
(May 21, 2009), https://www.aclunc.org/our-work/legal-docket/kincaid-v-city-fresno.  
The City agreed to pay over a million dollars to the class, which would be allocated in 
small allowances and to third parties providing living accommodations, as well as the 
attorneys’ fees and costs of the class action counsel.  Id. (contained in link entitled 
“Settlement Agreement with City of Fresno and Settlement Plan”).  In the agreement 
that had a time period of five years, the City of Fresno was required to give notice 
before any clean up (unless there was an immediate threat to health or safety).  Id.  
The city, in cleaning up, was also required to acknowledge “the fact that property is 
unattended does not necessarily mean that it has been discarded . . . [any] [r]easonable 
doubt about whether property is ‘trash or debris’ or valuable property should be re-
solved in favor of the conclusion that the property is valuable and should not be dis-
carded.”  Fresno, Cal., Garbage Removal; Clean-Up of Temporary Shelters; and Code 
Enforcement Abatement Procedures (Aug. 30, 2007) (also referred to as “Fresno 
Administrative Order 6-23”); see also Sanchez, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1092-93 (discuss-
ing the settlement agreement in Kincaid and Fresno Administrative Order 6-23).  In 
2011, the City of Fresno “set in motion a plan to eradicate a number of small shelters 
used by homeless individuals” and continued the destruction even after the city was 
informed that it would result in “the destruction of valuable personal property and the 
demolition of entire tents and shelters.”  Sanchez, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. 
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individuals to danger that they otherwise would not have faced.”265  The court 
noted that the allegations against the city and city officials were sufficient to 
raise a claim under the danger creation doctrine.266  Specifically, the court 
found that the city “timed the demolition of [plaintiffs’] shelter and personal 
property . . . to occur at the onset of the winter months that would bring cold 
and freezing temperatures, rain, and other difficult physical conditions”267 
and that the city “knew or should reasonably have known that their conduct” 
threatened plaintiff’s survival.268  Acting contrary to these considerations 
“created [a] substantial risk to [plaintiffs’] ability to continue to survive and 
[was] shocking to the conscience.”269 
Similarly, in Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the Central District of California’s finding that seizure of homeless posses-
sions constituted a violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
against forfeiture of property.270  In Lavan, the City of Los Angeles claimed 
that homeless persons abandoned their personal property, leaving it in the 
streets and sidewalks.271  The city argued that it was forced to seize and de-
stroy the homeless plaintiffs’ possessions to facilitate cleaning the streets in 
the name of environmental health.272  The court disagreed.273  Addressing the 
Fourth Amendment claim, the court stated, “[B]y seizing and destroying 
[plaintiffs’] unabandoned legal papers, shelters, and personal effects, the City 
meaningfully interfered with [plaintiffs’] possessory interests in that property.  
 
 265. Sanchez, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1101-02 (citing Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 
583 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 
1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000); Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 710 
(9th Cir. 1997); L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 266. Sanchez, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1102. 
 267. Id. at 1100. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Lavan v. City of L.A., 693 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 2012).  “The City does 
not deny that it has a policy and practice of seizing and destroying homeless persons’ 
unabandoned possessions.”  Id. at 1025.  The City of Los Angeles had previously 
seized homeless persons’ unabandoned possessions despite a temporary restraining 
order against the city prohibiting it from “[c]onfiscating the personal property of the 
homeless when it has not been abandoned and destroying it without notice . . . .”  
Justin v. City of L.A., No. CV0012352LGBAIJX, 2000 WL 1808426, at *13 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 5, 2000). 
 271. Lavan v. City of L.A., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  The 
City of Los Angeles claimed that “the Fourth Amendment’s protections coincide with 
the distance that a homeless person is from his or her property.”  Id.  The court held 
that “[t]here is no legal justification for this rule which is demeaning as it places no 
value on the homeless’ property and is not honest because the ‘rule’ purports to 
transmogrify obviously valuable property into trash.”  Id. (quoting Kincaid v. City of 
Fresno, No. 1:06-cv-1445 OWW SMS, 2006 WL 3542732, at *36 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 
2006)). 
 272. Id. at 1015. 
 273. Id. at 1016. 
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No more is needed to trigger the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness re-
quirement.”274  Noting that even if the city’s seizure of property had been 
held reasonable, the city’s choice to destroy homeless persons’ possessions 
rendered the city’s action unreasonable.275 
The Ninth Circuit in Lavan also held that the city action constituted a 
deprival of property without due process.276  After deciding that the possesso-
ry interest in homeless property was not limited by individual status,277 the 
court described the limitations on government depriving an individual of a 
property interest: 
As we have repeatedly made clear, “[t]he government may not take 
property like a thief in the night; rather, it must announce its intentions 
and give the property owner a chance to argue against the taking.” . . .  
This simple rule holds regardless of whether the property in question 
is an Escalade or an EDAR, a Cadillac or a cart.  The City demon-
strates that it completely misunderstands the role of due process by its 
contrary suggestion that homeless persons instantly and permanently 
lose any protected property interest in their possessions by leaving 
them momentarily unattended in violation of a municipal ordinance.  
As the district court recognized, the logic of the City’s suggestion 
would also allow it to seize and destroy cars parked in no-parking 
zones left momentarily unattended.278 
Finding that homeless property survived momentary violations of city 
ordinances, the court held that the Lavan plaintiffs maintained a due process 
challenge to city actions.279 
B.  Homeless Activities in Public Spaces 
Controls on public space do not just interact with the basic identifiers of 
homeless persons, they also define what homeless persons may do in the con-
 
 274. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1030. 
 275. Id.  By destroying the property of homeless persons, the seizure is rendered 
unconstitutional.  Id.  “[A] seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the 
Fourth Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possesso-
ry interests protected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘unreasonable sei-
zures.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124-25 (1984)). 
 276. Id. at 1032. 
 277. Id. at 1032-33 (“We reject the City’s suggestion that we create an exception 
to the requirements of due process for the belongings of homeless persons.”). 
 278. Id. at 1032 (quoting Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th 
Cir. 2008)). 
 279. Id.  (“Because homeless persons’ unabandoned possessions are ‘property’ 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the City must comport with the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause if it wishes to take 
and destroy them.”).  The city had not provided notice or due process to the plaintiffs, 
therefore, their Fourteenth Amendment claims stood.  Id. 
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text of a political environment in which their actions are already perceived as 
suspect.280  This interaction is described by one scholar as “political pedestri-
anism,” in which “two equally placed rights-bearing strangers[] encounter[] 
each other in public space” creating a “dyadic relationship.”281  Prevalent in 
ordinances relating to homeless persons’ behavior is the presumption that one 
of those rights-bearing strangers (the homeless person) fails to live up to their 
bargain to respect the individual rights of the other stranger.282  Thus, con-
duct-oriented ordinances (like panhandling restrictions, public urination stat-
utes, loitering, and jaywalking restrictions) place the burden of identity 
change on homeless persons with minimal or no social support for changing 
the conditions that give rise to the identity. 
Ordinances that control aggressive panhandling serve as a primary ex-
ample of how conduct-oriented ordinances fail to accurately understand 
homeless identity.  These ordinances pit the mobile commuter against the 
static homeless person.  As one scholar has noted, 
the balance [in panhandling ordinances] is between the right of the 
panhandler to “engage” and that of the pedestrian to be secure against 
an “intrusion” of their personal space . . . into an area where they no 
longer feel content.  Such “intrusions” are seen as violating a “sense of 
safety.”  Characterized in highly spatialized terms, the balance be-
tween the two turns on the decision of the pedestrian (who, it should 
be noted, is in motion) to exercise autonomous control over their “per-
sonal space.”  Their territory must be respected.283 
The state’s choice to enforce the rights of the commuter in this encoun-
ter does more than control the conduct of the other participant – it suggests 
that controlling the homeless person’s conduct can, in effect, reclaim the 
space on behalf of the state.284  For example, one court described panhandling 
as the “archetypical expression of disorder.”285 
 
 280. See supra Parts I.A-B. 
 281. NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: SIDEWALKS AND THE REGULATION 
OF PUBLIC FLOW 96 (2011).  
 282. See supra Part II.A. 
 283. Nicholas Blomley, The Right to Pass Freely: Circulation, Begging, and the 
Bounded Self, 19 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 331, 338 (2010). 
 284. Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law, supra note 10, at 16-17. 
 285. Looper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1030 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (“One of the earliest discussions of the disorder caused by poverty and begging 
is found in The Plutus by Aristophanes, which was first performed around 388 B.C.  
Against the background of the emergence of the new god, Plutus (Wealth), in the 
Greek Pantheon, Aristophanes constructs a debate between the anthropomorphized 
character of Poverty and the central protagonist of Plutus, Chremylus.  Poverty argues 
eloquently for the virtues of poverty and begging but is rejected by Chremylus as the 
source of human misery and social chaos.”) (citing ARISTOPHANES, THE PLUTUS 629, 
635-36 (Benjamin B. Rogers trans., 1952)), aff’d, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).  The 
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Most courts have found that homeless persons in general do not state a 
First Amendment challenge to solicitation ordinances in the absence of some 
expressed prohibition on speech, vague prohibitions by the city, or an as-
applied problem in enforcement.286  In general, courts uphold solicitation 
ordinances, finding that homeless solicitations are no different from other 
types of solicitations that occur in public.287  Thus, courts generally uphold 
ordinances that limit solicitations by manner288 or place289 restrictions, unless 
 
court, while noting that the tension between the First Amendment rights of the pan-
handler were illusory toward society’s greater interests, said: 
Since the early days of western civilization, people have sought to define the 
conduct that violates society’s sense of order and that which society permits or 
even encourages.  Yet, as civilization as a whole has moved forward, people 
have learned time and again that suppressing speech and conduct deemed con-
trary to a society’s sense of order merely masks the underlying disorder. 
Id. (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1984); PLATO, THE LAWS 
(A.E. Taylor trans., 1963); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Paul Shorey trans., 1963); 
SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE (Sir Richard Jebb ed., 1932); THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR 143-51, 156-64, 236-45 (M.I. Finley ed., Rex Warner trans., 
1954)); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169 (“The court also of 
Areopagus at Athens punished idleness, and exerted a right of examining every citi-
zen in what manner he spent his time.”); AESCHYLUS, AGAMEMNON (G.M. Cookson 
trans., 1952) (Clytaemnestra’s silencing the public speech of Cassandra); 
THUCYDIDES, supra note 285, at 156-64 (role and transformation of speech as both 
cause and effect of the disintegration of social relationships and individual character 
in the face of the collapse of the state) 
 286. See, e.g., Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 878 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 287. For example, in Doucette v. City of Santa Monica, homeless plaintiffs 
brought challenges to the city enforcement of ordinances prohibiting, amongst other 
things, solicitation.  955 F. Supp. 1192, 1198-99 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 288. Id. at 1201.  The ordinance in Doucette prohibited “abusive solicitation”: 
“Abusive solicitation” means to do one or more of the following while engag-
ing in solicitation or immediately thereafter: 
(1) Coming closer than three feet to the person solicited unless and until the 
person solicited indicates that he or she wishes to make a donation; 
(2) Blocking or impeding the passage of the person solicited; 
(3) Following the person solicited by proceeding behind, ahead or alongside 
him or her after the person solicited declines to make a donation; 
(4) Threatening the person solicited with physical harm by word or gesture; 
(5) Abusing the person solicited with words which are offensive and inherent-
ly likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction; 
(6) Touching the solicited person without the solicited person’s consent; . . . . 
Id. 
 289. Id. at 1201-02.  Additionally, the ordinance prohibited place-based solicita-
tions at: 
(a) Bus stops; 
(b) Public transportation vehicles or facilities; 
(c) A vehicle on public streets or alleyways; 
(d) Public parking lots or structures; 
(e) Outdoor dining areas of restaurants or other dining establishments serving 
food for immediate consumption; 
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they present other constitutional problems, such as vagueness or as-applied 
due process problems.290  Courts express this alignment by suggesting that 
homeless persons have the same tools at their disposal as other speech partic-
ipants, or that homeless persons are similarly situated as others.291 
For instance, in Doucette v. Santa Monica, the court held that homeless 
persons could utilize other avenues of speech, such as leaving a pamphlet 
with directions where individuals could send donations – despite the fact 
those homeless persons may not have addresses themselves.292  Moreover, the 
ordinances did not reflect a disagreement of point of view between the city 
and homeless persons because homeless persons were not restrained from 
speaking in general – they were only restrained from asking for money or 
other donations.293  Similarly, in Gresham v. Peterson, the court upheld an 
aggressive panhandling statute, rejecting an argument by the ACLU that the 
statute was specifically targeted towards homeless persons.294  The court said 
that the ordinance “applies with equal force to anyone who would solicit a 
charitable contribution . . . .  It would punish street people as well as Salva-
tion Army bell ringers outside of stores at Christmas, so long as the appeal 
involved a vocal request for an immediate donation.”295 
In contrast, some courts suggest there are vast, rather than minor, differ-
ences that warrant different treatment.296  For example, in Young v. New York 
City Transit Authority, the Second Circuit distinguished between constitu-
tionally protected solicitations, as described by the Supreme Court in Village 
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, and panhandling: 
Both the reasoning of Schaumburg and the experience of the TA point 
to the difference between begging and solicitation by organized chari-
ties.  In the instant case, the difference must be examined not from the 
imaginary heights of Mount Olympus but from the very real context of 
the New York City subway.  While organized charities serve commu-
nity interests by enhancing communication and disseminating ideas, 
the conduct of begging and panhandling in the subway amounts to 
nothing less than a menace to the common good. . . .  The lone dissent 
in Schaumburg recognized this difference stating: “Nothing in the 
United States Constitution should prevent residents of a community 
from making the collective judgment that certain worthy charities may 
 
(f) Within fifty feet of an automated teller machine; or 
(g) A queue of five or more persons waiting to gain admission to a place or 
vehicle, or waiting to purchase an item or admission ticket. 
Id. 
 290. See Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 907 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 291. See Id. at 904; Doucette, 955 F. Supp. at 1199-200. 
 292. 955 F. Supp. at 1205. 
 293. Id. at 1201. 
 294. Gresham, 225 F.3d at 901. 
 295. Id. at 903. 
 296. See Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990), vacated, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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solicit . . . while at the same time insulating themselves against pan-
handlers, profiteers, and peddlers.297 
Moreover, the court, citing a 1988 public health study, stated, 
“[B]egging contributes to a public perception that the subway is fraught with 
hazard and danger.”298  While finding that a total ban on panhandling would 
violate First Amendment rights, the ban on subway panhandling was narrow-
ly tailored to meet a substantial public interest.299 
Lastly, some aspects of homeless activity demonstrate the visi-
ble/invisible quality of homeless existence.  This manifests itself in both 
over-policing and under-servicing homeless persons, yet placing the burden 
of internalizing the effects directly on homeless persons.  Gary Blasi con-
ducted a citations study of Skid Row finding that persons in Skid Row were 
substantially more likely to be cited for minor infractions, such as jay-
walking and loitering, than persons in other areas of the city.300  This over-
policing of homeless activities created greater burdens on homeless persons, 
who are less likely to be able to pay court fines or may lose property due to 
jail time.301 
Likewise, a two-year study of environmental hazards in the Skid Row 
area revealed toxic conditions due to the prevalence of human waste.302  
 
 297. 903 F.2d 146, 156 (2d Cir. 1990); see VALVERDE, supra note 58, at 207 (not-
ing that “[e]xisting structures tend to favor self-appointed leaders, organized mainly 
around home owning, and they systematically exclude renters, young people, and, to 
some extent, racialized groups . . .”). 
 298. Young, 903 F.2d at 149. 
 299. Id. at 160. 
 300. See Blasi, supra note 11. 
 301. Id. 
 302. See CNTY. OF L.A. PUB. HEALTH DEP’T, REPORT OF FINDINGS – REQUEST 
FROM CITY OF LOS ANGELES TO ADDRESS PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES IN THE SKID ROW 
AREA OF DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES (2012) (on file with author) (noting findings of 
small piles of feces and urine on the sidewalks and grass areas of the majority of 
streets surveyed (8 out of 10 blocks) and of three restrooms reported, one was inoper-
able and one was unsanitary); CNTY. OF L.A. PUB. HEALTH DEP’T, REPORT OF 
FINDINGS – REINSPECTION REPORT OF FINDINGS – REQUEST FROM CITY OF LOS 
ANGELES TO ADDRESS PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES IN THE SKID ROW AREA OF DOWNTOWN 
LOS ANGELES (2012) (on file with author) (noting a 76% reduction in urine and feces 
on sidewalks since May 21, 2012 inspection, which coincided with all three public 
restrooms becoming operable, with only one noted as having trash present); CNTY. OF 
L.A. PUB. HEALTH DEP’T, REPORT CURRENT STATUS OF CONDITIONS ON SKID ROW 
(2012) (on file with author) (noting significant reduction of environmental problems, 
compliance with environmental concerns, and all restroom facilities as operable); 
CNTY. OF L.A. PUB. HEALTH DEP’T, REPORT CURRENT STATUS OF CONDITIONS ON 
SKID ROW (2012) (on file with author); CNTY. OF L.A. PUB. HEALTH DEP’T, FOLLOW-
UP REPORT REGARDING CURRENT STATUS OF CONDITIONS ON SKID ROW (2013) (on 
file with author) (noting that upon reinspection urine and feces were found in fourteen 
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Those studies also revealed that in the twelve-block area of Skid Row (which 
houses more than 6,000 persons) only four public restrooms are available – 
three of which were inoperable during various re-inspection times.303  The 
City of Los Angeles claimed that the environmental state of the area required 
street cleaning, which led to the confiscation and destruction of homeless 
belongings, and ultimately a civil rights lawsuit on behalf of homeless per-
sons.304  While homeless persons prevailed in the suit, many of the conditions 
that led to the city’s preferred means of cleaning the streets remain – insuffi-
cient facilities for the population who needs them.305  Homeless persons in-
ternalize these conditions by living them out.306 
C.  Homeless Control and the “Not in My Backyard” Mentality 
Finally, some legal decisions may impose controls indirectly on the 
homeless by restricting the places that homeless service providers may oper-
ate.  “Not in My Backyard” (“NIMBY”) rhetoric, often tends to flow from 
self-appointed leaders (usually homeowners) who often have greater access, 
more resources, and better political inroads to advance a particular view.307  
Notably, NIMBY approaches have been described as being particularly ex-
clusive of marginalized groups – “especially [towards] those who are poor 
and/or live in rental housing.”308  This is particularly evident in cases involv-
ing private owners alleging that providers attract homeless persons who cre-
ate a nuisance on their property.309  Others present challenges to other legal 
processes that would validate their presence – such as funding programs or 
violations of behavioral or zoning ordinance.310  Lastly, some cases reflect 
government attempts to disrupt service providers on the basis of claiming the 
 
blocks of Skid Row and that three of four public restrooms in the area were inopera-
ble). 
 303. See sources cited supra note 302. 
 304. Lavan v. City of L.A., 693 F.3d 1022, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 305. See id. at 1033. 
 306. See supra Part I.A. 
 307. VALVERDE, supra note 58, at 207.  Peter Margulies describes this effect in 
relation to human service providers: “Defects in human inference account for much 
popular opposition to community human service facilities.  Human inference runs on 
heuristics and biases which guide and simplify thought.  Unfortunately, these devices 
magnify the perceived risks of association with those labeled as outsiders, including 
human service clients.”  Peter Margulies, Building Communities of Virtue: Political 
Theory, Land Use Policy, and the “Not in My Backyard” Syndrome, 43 SYR. L. REV. 
945, 954-55 (1992). 
 308. VALVERDE, supra note 58, at 207; see, e.g., Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 
903 F.2d 146, 156 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 309. See, e.g., Kum Man Jhae v. City of Pasadena, No. B244435, 2013 WL 
5492572, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2013). 
 310. See, e.g., Franklinton Coal. v. Open Shelter, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 861, 862, 864-
65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). 
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operations constitute a “nuisance.”311 In both instances, homeless persons are 
legally invisible – that is, the rights being asserted relate to the property own-
ers’ right to either be free of the effect that homeless persons produce on their 
land or the property owners’ right to provide services to homeless persons.312 
1.  Homeless Persons as Nuisances to Property Owners 
Property owners in numerous cases allege that the operation of a facility 
that attracts homeless people constitutes a nuisance.313  The allegations range 
from increased frequency of transients to actual allegations of violence.  At 
least one court has found that a homeless service provider could be a private 
nuisance to neighboring homeowners.  In Armory Park v. Episcopal Commu-
nity Services in Arizona, a neighboring homeowners’ association brought a 
claim against the center claiming that homeless patrons disrupt their neigh-
borhood.314  The complaint alleged that the presence of the food center had 
changed the character of their neighborhood.315  Notably, the association 
claimed that before the center opened, there were few small businesses; that 
the opening of the center increased the traffic of “transients” through the 
neighborhood; that these transients began lining up near the neighborhood 
before the center was opened and lingered afterwards; that crime had in-
creased since the center’s opening and that residents were frightened by the 
transients.316  Finding that the center could be held derivatively liable for the 
 
 311. See, e.g., Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in 
Ariz., 712 P.2d 914, 915-16 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc). 
 312. See infra Part II.C. 
 313. See N.C. Grp. L.L.C. v. Macerich Co., No. CV-08-158-PHX-ROS, 2009 WL 
692310, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009) (Plaintiff alleged against neighboring property 
owner that nuisance arose because the parcel “fell into disrepair and became a ‘haven 
for graffiti, homeless people, drug abusers, and other sundry criminal activity’”); 
DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Grp., Inc., 722 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001) (alleging that the maintenance of an adult shelter was a public nuisance because 
it was a “magnet” inducing nonresidents to live in the town without proper screening 
or supervision); Franklinton Coal., 469 N.E.2d at 867-68 (finding that the operation 
of a shelter, absent actual evidence of harm, was insufficient to constitute a nuisance). 
 314. Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n, 712 P.2d at 915.  “On December 11, 
1982, . . . Episcopal Community Services in Arizona . . . opened the St. Martin’s 
Center . . . in Tucson, Arizona.”  Id. at 915.  The center was located along Arizona 
Avenue, which served as the western boundary for the Amory Park Historical Resi-
dential District.  Id.  Two years after operating in this location, the homeowners’ 
association filed a law suit to enjoin the Center’s free food distribution center.  Id. 
 315. Id. at 915-16. 
 316. Id. at 916.  The court described the neighborhood complaint in the following 
way: 
[b]efore the Center opened, the area had been primarily residential with a few 
small businesses.  When the Center began operating in December 1982, many 
transients crossed the area daily on their way to and from the Center.  Alt-
hough the Center was only open from 5:00 to 6:00 p.m., patrons lined up well 
59
Roark: Homelessness at the Cathedral
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
112 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
actions of its patrons, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the presence of 
the center directly related to the inconvenience of the property owners.317  
The court stated that it was the practice of “offering free meals, which ‘set in 
motion’ the forces resulting in injury to the Amory Park residents.”318  De-
spite recognizing the social utility of the center, the Arizona Supreme Court 
found that the burden to property owners was too great.319  By defining the 
actions of homeless persons as a nuisance, the court found that the utility of 
the center was not sufficient enough to outweigh the burdens suffered by 
neighbors.320 
In contrast, most courts analyzing nuisance relating to homeless service 
providers do so under a public nuisance theory.  For example, in Pilgrim v. 
 
before this hour and often lingered in the neighborhood long after finishing 
their meal.  The Center rented an adjacent fenced lot for a waiting area and 
organized neighborhood cleaning projects, but the trial judge apparently felt 
these efforts were inadequate to control the activity stemming from the Cen-
ter.  Transients frequently trespassed onto residents’ yards, sometimes urinat-
ing, defecating, drinking and littering on the residents’ property.  A few broke 
into storage areas and unoccupied homes, and some asked residents for 
handouts.  The number of arrests in the area increased dramatically.  Many 
residents were frightened or annoyed by the transients and altered their life-
styles to avoid them. 
Id. 
 317. Id. at 920. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 921.  The Supreme Court of Arizona found the following statement by 
the trial judge to be “illuminating” and quoted the statement in its opinion: 
It is distressing to this Court that an activity such as defendants [sic] should be 
restrained.  Providing for the poor and the homeless is certainly a worthwhile, 
praiseworthy [sic] activity.  It is particularly distressing to this Court because 
it [defendant] has no control over those who are attracted to the kitchen while 
they are either coming or leaving the premises.  However, the right to the 
comfortable enjoyment of one’s property is something that another’s activities 
should not affect, the harm being suffered by the Armory Park Neighborhood 
and the residents therein is irreparable and substantial, for which they have no 
adequate legal remedy. 
Id.  The Supreme Court of Arizona expressed a similar lament: 
The common law has long recognized that the usefulness of a particular ac-
tivity may outweigh the inconveniences, discomforts and changes it causes 
some persons to suffer.  We, too, acknowledge the social value of the Center.  
Its charitable purpose, that of feeding the hungry, is entitled to greater defer-
ence than pursuits of lesser intrinsic value.  It appears from the record that 
[Episcopal Community Services’] purposes in operating the Center were en-
tirely admirable.  However, even admirable ventures may cause unreasonable 
interferences. . . . We do not believe that the law allows the costs of a charita-
ble enterprise to be visited in their entirety upon the residents of a single 
neighborhood.  The problems of dealing with the unemployed, the homeless 
and the mentally ill are also matters of community or governmental responsi-
bility. 
Id. 
 320. Id. 
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Our Lady of Victories Church, the neighboring landowner alleged that several 
properties she owned suffered damage as a result of the defendant’s shelter.321  
The plaintiff alleged that acts of violence, vandalism, noise, and general vul-
gar behavior stem from the shelter and its residents.322  She also alleged that 
one of her tenants was the victim of a breaking and entering from a resident 
of the shelter, and that another tenant’s guest was physically assaulted.323  In 
assessing her claim as a public nuisance, the court said “[t]he harm she alleg-
es is essentially a communal one,” and that she “failed to allege facts . . . ‘dif-
ferent in kind’ from the harm the rest of the community has purportedly suf-
fered.”324 
2.  Claims That Other Government Ordinances Render the Homeless 
Service Provider a Nuisance 
Citizens have tried to enjoin homeless service providers and businesses 
that cater to homeless persons on theories that the establishment was operat-
ing contrary to a specific city ordinance or exceeded its government li-
cense.325  At the heart of these actions is a claim that the service provider or 
business constitutes a nuisance.326  However, where the decision to authorize 
 
 321. Pilgrim v. Our Lady of Victories Church, No. 12-P-685, 2013 WL 1759415, 
at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at *2. 
 325. See W. 97th-W. 98th Sts. Block Ass’n v. Volunteers of Am. of Greater N.Y., 
581 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (dismissing claims by local property 
owners’ association that government project failed to require compliance of shelter 
with State Environmental Quality Review Act); Greentree at Murray Hill Condo. v. 
Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, 550 N.Y.S.2d 981, 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (in-
volving action by local property owners’ association against city-funded shelter oper-
ated by church arguing that shelter operation met the definition of hotel and thus the 
city improperly failed to require compliance with the State Environmental Quality 
Review Act (“SEQRA”)); Franklinton Coal. v. Open Shelter, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 861, 
862, 864-65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (denying claim by plaintiff that city zoning board 
improperly applied the city zoning code to allow a homeless shelter and kitchen under 
the city code definition of “hotel”). 
 326. For example, in an action by a Business Improvement District (“BID”) to 
alter the city’s Conditional Use Permit to a shelter to require compliance with 
SEQRA, BID alleged several nuisance-like claims: 
the proximity of the drop-in center to [BID] members harms them in a manner 
not experienced by the public in general . . .; their sidewalks and/or properties 
are being used as “bathrooms”; and their customers are being harassed, scared 
and/or intimidated. . . . [Additionally] there are homeless criminals and/or 
Level 3 Sex Offenders that are frequently housed at the drop-in center without 
any monitoring or supervision, thus presenting further safety concerns to BID 
members. 
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a service provider’s operation is a land-use decision, courts tend to defer to 
the decisions of permitting and zoning boards, absent some other evidence of 
nuisance.327 
For example, in Mercer Island Citizens for Fair Process v. Tent City 4, 
a group of citizens brought a claim to enjoin a church’s operation of a tempo-
rary homeless encampment on the theory that the city code did not permit 
temporary encampments in single-family residential areas.328  The city issued 
a temporary use permit to the church on the belief that the city would be una-
ble to prevent the church from operating such an encampment.329  The city 
then entered into a temporary use agreement that ensured all city code provi-
sions were adhered to, including requirements that the encampment provide: 
visual buffers, restrictions on lighting, restraints for the maximum number of 
residents, warrant and sex offender status checks on residents, parking, code 
of conduct, and other legal compliance.330  The court rejected the citizens’ 
group claims alleging due process violations and nuisance on the basis of the 
zoning decision.331 
In contrast, the California Court of Appeals in Kum Man Jhae v. City of 
Pasadena adjudicated a liquor store as a public nuisance for failing to comply 
with directives from the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol.332  At the core of the complaints were several allegations by neighbors 
that the store had a detrimental effect on the neighborhood by attracting 
homeless persons to the area.333  One neighbor testified that the liquor store 
“attracts loiterers and drunks and contributes to littering, pan-handling, public 
drunkenness, public urination and other nuisance activities.”334  Another 
neighbor testified “there was a ‘big problem’ with sales of liquor at 6:30 a.m. 
because the homeless shelters ‘let out’ at 7:00 a.m.”335  “He testified that the 
homeless people ‘come’ to the liquor store to get their ‘drunk on’ for the 
day.”336 
Lastly, some courts have taken up the question of whether government 
programs that sponsor homeless shelters impose too great of a burden on 
community resources.  For example, in Greentree at Murray Hill Condomin-
 
White Plains Downtown Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc. v. Spano, 833 N.Y.S.2d 868, 871-72 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (holding that BID had standing to assert claim relating to 
SEQRA claim, but not for nuisance action or Equal Protection claim). 
 327. See PACE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW LAND USE LAW CTR., BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO 
LAND USE LAW 9 (2014), available at http://www.law.pace.edu/sites/default/files/
LULC/LandUsePrimer.pdf. 
 328. 232 P.3d 1163, 1164-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
 329. Id. at 1165. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 1165, 1169. 
 332. No. B244435, 2013 WL 5492572, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2013). 
 333. Id. at *4. 
 334. Id. at *3. 
 335. Id. at *4. 
 336. Id. 
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ium v. Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, a local condominium association 
brought claims against a shelter and the City of New York seeking to enjoin 
its operations on the basis of non-compliance with State Environmental 
Regulations.337  In Greentree, the total state funding amounted to less than 
seventeen percent of its operating budget and less than three percent of its 
total budget.338  Under a prior determination that an emergency situation ex-
isted in the state, the court held that the Environmental Quality Review Act 
did not apply to this particular shelter.339 
Sometimes, these claims of insufficient resources included allegations 
that the homeless themselves would be insufficiently served or would be sub-
ject to similar nuisance like conditions.340  In Spring-Gar Community Civic 
Association, Inc. v. Homes for the Homeless, Inc., property owners asserted 
that burdening a town of 3,000 with a homeless shelter that caters to popula-
tions over 750 was too great of a burden and would result in nuisance to the 
local property owners.341  The property owners association alleged that the 
creation of this program would “constitute a menace to the public health, 
safety, moral and general welfare and well-being of the residents of Spring-
field Gardens and to the homeless people who would reside at [the] facility, 
thereby creating a public and private nuisance.”342  Capturing this sentiment, 
the court noted in concluding its opinion that, though constrained to deny 
plaintiffs’ claims,343 the problem expressed by plaintiffs contained legitimate 
concerns – whether raised genuinely or not: 
 
 337. 550 N.Y.S.2d 981, 984-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). 
 338. Id. at 983. 
 339. Id. at 986-87. 
 340. See, e.g., Spring-Gar Cmty. Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Homes for the Homeless, 
Inc., 135 Misc. 2d 689, 699 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
 341. See id. at 691, 693.  The plan called for the creation of a center from an old 
hotel to provide 200 units, one family per room.  The plan anticipated 450 children, of 
which approximately 200 would be teenagers.  Id.  The plan also called for compre-
hensive social services including job training, child care assistance, family counsel-
ing, and help in locating permanent housing.  Id. at 692. 
 342. Id. at 693 (emphasis added). 
 343. In doing so, the court admonished the New York State Legislature to com-
prise a legitimate plan for resolving the New York homeless problem: 
[t]hough this court is constrained to decide the case as it did, the court does so 
with a heavy heart.  The court does not believe that overburdening a commu-
nity, as will be done here, is just.  Accordingly, it asks the Legislature to ad-
dress the issue.  At the very least, the Legislature should promulgate laws that 
will provide the community with the right to a hearing on any proposed home-
less shelter, rather than mere notice of intent to act, when such action is 
planned.  The Legislature should also establish laws that would prevent large 
numbers of homeless from being placed into any one particular area.  In fact, a 
City Council Committee, the Select Committee on the Homeless, has recom-
mended to the Mayor of the City of New York that no shelter should contain 
more than 100 families.  Such recommendation should be enacted into law.  It 
is for the Legislature, not for the courts, to so act. 
Id. at 699.   The court also offered at least one solution: 
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[l]astly, this court is concerned not only about the people of Spring-
field Gardens, but also the homeless as well.  This court is not un-
mindful that the housing being provided to the homeless at the Sarato-
ga, though far from the least desirable, is also far from ideal.  It is 
concerned that families are being placed into a room for the homeless 
which is immediately surrounded on three sides by commercial and 
industrial plants including freight forwarders and cargo terminals, with 
trucks going in, out, and around, all the time.  On the fourth side lies 
Rockaway Boulevard, a major roadway that is now considered part of 
the Nassau-Queens Expressway.  This court views this location as be-
ing highly dangerous for its residents who desire to leave the premises 
by foot.  Further, the fact that families must share one room, including 
children sleeping with their parents, and children of the opposite sex 
sleeping together, is certainly not healthy, and cries out for relief.  
Moreover, the fact that the housing is merely transitory does not in-
sure continuity and stability in the education of children.344 
In each of these examples – like in the previous section – the presence 
of homeless people animated the charge of nuisance from neighbors.  The 
question of nuisance, though, was resolved by reference to whether the local 
government endorsed the activity.345  In the Mercer Island case, the negotia-
tion of a temporary use agreement shielded the Tent City operation from nui-
sance liability.346  In Kum Man Jhae, the supposed failure by the liquor store 
to control its premises led to the determination that the store presented a pub-
lic nuisance.347  And in Greentree and Spring-Gar, the nuisance arose 
 
The Comptroller of the City of New York, the Honorable Harrison J. Goldin, 
in a report dated April 23, 1987 entitled, Room to Spare But Nowhere to Go, 
set forth a better solution of this problem wherein he stated: “The City owns 
approximately 3700 occupied buildings which it seized for nonpayment of 
taxes; they contain about 4000 vacant apartments.  We inspected 445 of these 
apartments in 85 different occupied rem buildings; it would cost under 9 mil-
lion dollars to rehabilitate them all”.  This would give permanent housing to 
the homeless, it would stop shunting families and children from one inhumane 
shelter to another.  These people by temporary housing are denied stable envi-
ronments.  Temporary housing fragments social and educational needs.  The 
city needs an intensive city-wide rehabilitation program to meet the problem 
on a permanent basis.  In the long run, this would save more money by ad-
dressing the problem head on. 
Id. at 700. 
 344. Id. at 699-700. 
 345. See Mercer Island Citizens for Fair Process v. Tent City 4, 232 P.3d 1163, 
1164 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
 346. Id. at 1168. 
 347. Kum Man Jhae v. City of Pasadena, No. B244435, 2013 WL 5492572, at *9 
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2013). 
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through the combination of homeless presence and the municipality providing 
insufficient support for homeless service.348 
3.  Government Acts Towards Property Owners Attracting Homeless 
Persons 
Finally, sometimes control of homeless providers occurs through direct 
government action.349  The source of these actions articulate similar claims as 
private owners – that the providing of services to homeless persons consti-
tutes a nuisance on public resources or use of space which must be guard-
ed.350  Some of the cases involve direct police action, such as Fifth Avenue 
Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, where police enacted a policy to 
physically prevent homeless persons from sleeping on church property, de-
spite the church’s permission.351  Other cases involve the administrative ap-
proval of zoning boards to approve, or not approve, institutions serving as 
shelters.352  In both instances, like the other issues of space allocation, the 
issue relates less to homeless persons and their right to be in space, and more 
to the right of others to allow homeless persons to occupy space. 
a.  The Right to House Homeless Persons 
In Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, the City Po-
lice engaged in a policy of dispersing homeless persons sleeping on the steps 
of the church.353  Specifically, the police informed the church that homeless 
persons would not be allowed to sleep on the steps any longer; they later 
“formed a cordon in the front of the [c]hurch” to prevent homeless persons 
from accessing the steps.354  The city claimed that the allowance of the church 
 
 348. Greentree at Murray Hill Condo. v. Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, 550 
N.Y.S.2d 981, 984-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Spring-Gar Cmty. Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Homes for the Homeless, Inc., 540 N.Y.S.2d 453, 453-54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
 349. See, e.g., Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of N.Y., 293 F.3d 570, 572-
73 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 350. See id. at 573. 
 351. Id. at 572. 
 352. See, e.g., Turning Point, Inc. v. City of Caldwell, 74 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
 353. 293 F.3d at 573. 
 354. Id. at 572.  Considering cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court 
discussed the police action: 
“[T]he police came onto Church property and told the Church representatives . 
. . and the Homeless Neighbors, that the Homeless Neighbors would not be 
permitted to sleep outside the Church, and that if they lay down on the ground, 
or remained beyond the time permitted by the police, they would be arrested.  
The police formed a cordon in front of the Church . . . to block the front steps 
of the Church . . . . All of the Homeless Neighbors who came to the Church 
that night to sleep were intimidated by police threats, including threats of ar-
rest, into leaving the Church property that night instead of sleeping there . . . 
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to use its steps constituted “an inadequate provision of shelter ‘in a civilized 
society.’”355  In the district court opinion that followed the Second Circuit’s 
order to remand, this description of inadequate shelter was described in terms 
relating to nuisance: amongst the contention that the homeless persons that 
choose to sleep on the church steps are “service resistant,”356 the city claimed: 
(1) homeless persons who sleep on Church property have no access to 
Church toilet facilities between the hours of 9 p.m. and 5:30 a.m. and 
relieve themselves in public in violation of §§ 143.03, 131.01, and 
153.09 of the New York City Health Code, and § 16–118(b) of the 
New York City Administrative Code; (2) the Church operates a de 
facto shelter that fails to maintain minimum habitability standards; (3) 
allowing homeless persons to sleep on Church property is not a proper 
accessory use and thus violates New York City Zoning Regulation § 
12–10; and (4) homeless persons’ activities create a public nui-
sance.357 
The city’s approach treated all homeless persons as sources of problems 
despite the lack of evidence that actual problems arose from homeless occu-
pancy of the church steps.358  For example, the city stated as a reason for the 
total prohibition that the police could not remove just one bad actor, but that 
it “must be all or none.”359  The district court said in response: 
It is also troubling that the City adopted a group approach to individu-
al violations of the law, taking adverse action against all homeless 
persons who wished to sleep on Church property based upon individu-
als’ misconduct. . . .  The City has thus left no room for homeless per-
sons who sleep on Church property without violating any laws in the 
process, a fact that is constitutionally problematic.360 
 
The police informed the Church . . . that [it] would not [sic] longer be allowed 
to permit anyone to sleep . . . on the Church Steps . . . and that anyone who at-
tempts to do so . . . will be arrested . . .” 
Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of N.Y., No. 01 CIV. 11493 (LMM), 2004 
WL 2471406, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004), aff’d, 177 F. App’x 198 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 355. Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church, 293 F.3d at 573. 
 356. Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church, 2004 WL 2471406, at *3. 
The record indicates that some portion of the homeless persons who sleep on 
Church property do so because they are “service resistant,” and would be as 
unlikely to stay in an indoor church shelter as in a City shelter. . . . Effectively 
requiring the Church to forgo its work with service resistant homeless persons 
would force the Church to modify its religious activity; a result that is entirely 
improper. 
Id. 
 357. Id. at *4. 
 358. Id. at *8-9. 
 359. Id. at *6. 
 360. Id. 
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The over-breadth of the city’s actions, together with the First Amend-
ment right of the church to exercise its religious beliefs (through service to 
the poor) rendered the city action problematic.361  Notably though, it was the 
church’s right to exercise its First Amendment entitlement, and not the home-
less persons’ rights to be someplace, that shaped both the district court and 
Second Circuit analysis.362 
b.  Administrative Limitations on Housing Homeless Persons 
Administrative matters, such as compliance with zoning schemes and 
buildings codes, can present challenges to housing homeless persons.  These 
extra costs create barriers to serving as many persons as homeless providers 
would like to serve.363  Often in the underfunded, underserved world of 
homeless service providers, service that is available occurs in ill-equipped 
buildings, which were not originally designed to serve the homeless popula-
tions.364  Because most service providers themselves are not well funded, 
choices must be made to serve the populations that they can in the inadequate 
facilities to which they have access.365  All others must be turned away.366 
In Turning Point, Inc. v. City of Caldwell, the Ninth Circuit considered a 
claim by a homeless shelter against the city, and the city zoning and planning 
commission, regarding issuance of a special use permit as a condition for 
operating its shelter.367  The shelter claimed that the language of the ordi-
nance that gave the board the “authority to determine whether the use ‘would 
cause any damage, hazard, nuisance or other detriment to persons or property 
 
 361. Id. at *5-6. 
 362. Id. at *2 (“That the Church’s practice of allowing homeless persons to sleep 
out-of-doors on its property is an ‘exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs,’ . . . 
cannot be seriously disputed.”) (quoting Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of 
N.Y., 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
 363. Courts have drawn distinctions between city zoning provisions designated 
for safety of inhabitants (such as maximum occupancy standards) with those purely 
designed to exclude by status.  See, e.g., City of Edmunds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 
U.S. 725 (1995) (Ginsburg J.) (holding that while Fair Housing exemptions apply to 
maximum occupancy restrictions, defining “family” by the number of unrelated per-
sons that could inhabit a building did not reach safety rationale for the Fair Housing 
standards). 
 364. See Marcus Baram, Los Angeles Struggles with Homeless Crisis, Lack of 
Shelters, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:34 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/02/16/homeless-shelters-los-angeles-america_n_1280909.html (describing 
challenges in converting buildings to shelters in Los Angeles). 
 365. See Kaitlin Schroeder, After Multiple Delays, Franklin County’s First Home-
less Shelter to Open Monday, MORNING SENTINEL (Nov. 9, 2013), http://www
.onlinesentinel.com/news/After_multiple_delays__Franklin_County_s_first_homeless
_shelter_to_open_Monday_.html (noting that the shelter’s compliance with sprinkler 
system mandate, which it could not afford, held up the approval). 
 366. See Baram, supra note 364. 
 367. 74 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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in the vicinity’” was overbroad and vague.368  While the court disagreed on 
the vagueness point, the court did note that the requirement of an annual re-
view as a part of the permit issuance was outside the board’s authority.369  
The court concluded that the “ordinary law of nuisance and the city’s power 
to declare and abate nuisances” was sufficient to police concerns the city had 




Courts responding to homelessness in space find themselves navigating 
disputes between those with property and those without.  Cities often position 
themselves as property holders, and seek to foreclose homeless occupancy.  
Likewise, city constraints on what may be done in public often criminalize 
basic aspects of survival, such as finding safe places to rest, obtaining food, 
or maintaining presence.  When homeless persons do have legal remedies, 
they are always constitutional in nature, often out of practical reach, and they 
are unlikely to engage the unique problems of homelessness.  But even in 
those constitutionally-based actions, homeless persons still must internalize 
the inconvenience caused by cities’ and property owners’ preferred choices to 
exclude homeless persons from space.371  Communication breaks down.  Cit-
ies act without homeless participation.  A lawsuit commences.  Wash, lather, 
rinse, repeat. 
PART III: HOMELESSNESS AND INFORMATION 
The impact of collective identity on space described in Part II begs the 
question, “How should space account for homeless persons’ identities?”  Part 
II argued that courts often apply nuisance-like conceptions to addressing 
homeless occupancy of space.  In traditional nuisance actions, two (or more) 
property owners quarrel about whether one’s use of land interferes with an-
other’s enjoyment of land.372  Unlike parties in traditional nuisance cases, 
homeless persons lack conventionally recognized property rights.373  Thus, 
when faced with actions that are nuisance-like, it is not surprising that courts 
base their decisions on either one group’s property right (landowners, shelter 
providers, and governments) or the other groups’ inalienable rights (homeless 
persons and religious service providers).  This means that courts, in choosing 
 
 368. Id. at 944. 
 369. Id. at 945. 
 370. Id. 
 371. See discussion supra Part II. 
 372. See John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265, 265 (2001). 
 373. See Sarah E. Hamill, Private Property Rights and Public Responsibility: 
Leaving Room for the Homeless, 30 WINDSOR REV. OF LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 91, 109 
(2011) (describing one Canadian court’s response to homelessness as recognizing a 
limited right to remain in public space, but with the caveat that they would also have 
to “move somewhere else”). 
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entitlements that forge a collective identity, choose based on adopting the 
subjective understandings of landed persons, or the objective understandings 
of the whole community. 
This choice between purely localized identity and universal identity cre-
ates a scale problem in which communities fail to account for the visible 
homeless in their presence.374  This problem of “scale” leaves communities 
with few incentives to reconcile homelessness as a community problem.  
Instead, the problem is isolated as the homeless individual’s burden.375  This 
part argues that this binary means of reconciling responsibilities and duties 
does not lead to community-based solutions.  Rather, homeless individuals 
(or those in the least advantageous position) are expected to conform and 
reconcile to social spatial expectations.  In short, in law and policy, home-
lessness is treated as an individual concern.  By relying on purely subjective 
and purely objective ways of defining identity, courts and cities often fail to 
account for compromise solutions.376 
This part describes in two strokes how subjective and objective identi-
ties populate homelessness decisions.  First, embracing Guido Calabresi and 
Douglas Melamed’s classic One View of the Cathedral, collective identity 
emerges healthily in nuisance cases because courts have all three types of 
entitlement shifting mechanisms at their disposal.377  This reduces problems 
of scale.378  Second, incorporating a conceptual frame for understanding 
homeless persons as stakeholders to public space (outside of inalienable 
rights) affords courts and cities a more balanced approach to homeless solu-
tions.379 
A.  Homelessness at the Cathedral 
As Part II describes in the case of homelessness, the power of exclusion 
is a primary means for asserting what entitlements society will tolerate.380  
Why we enforce an owner’s right to exclude and why we do not is a marker 
for understanding collective identity.  The Cathedral, or the structure of enti-
tlements throughout the common law, depends on society’s validation of one 
person’s claim for an entitlement over another’s.381  But as Carol Rose so 
eloquently pointed out, it is often in the shadows of the Cathedral that we find 
the true meaning for which property entitlements stand.382  Rose points out 
 
 374. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 375. See Valverde, supra note 74, at 148-49. 
 376. See discussion supra Part II. 
 377. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1093; see infra Part III.A. 
 378. See id. 
 379. See infra Part III.B. 
 380. See supra Part II.C. 
 381. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1092-93. 
 382. See generally Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 
2175 (1997). 
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that the shadows of entitlements are often other socially animating principles 
– society’s choice to shift entitlements due to accidents that may arise or con-
tracts that may be formed.383  In each instance, society makes a choice to 
recognize the shifting entitlement because either the forced transfer of an 
accident is just, or the collaborative transfer of a contract is efficient.384  
Whether it is society’s initial choice to recognize the entitlement, or to shift 
the entitlement because such a choice is fair or efficient, the Cathedral and its 
shadows reflect a broader imprint of what society will acknowledge as valid 
uses of space.385  In short, the Cathedral, its shadows, and the forces that rear-
range them all suggest something about collective identity. 
Calabresi and Melamed’s One View of the Cathedral describes shifts in 
entitlements as a tension between the state’s choice to honor voluntary trans-
fer, forced transfer, and non-transfer.386  These rationales for why entitle-
ments shift are built around subjective, objective and subjective/objective 
perceptions of the entitlement.387  Calabresi and Melamed call these percep-
tions property rules, liability rules, and inalienable entitlements.388  Entitle-
ments shift, according to Calabresi and Melamed, according to choices by 
society.389  These choices are often predicated on whether society deems the 
act or entitlement to be one which is best protected by the bargaining powers 
of the parties (thereby enforcing a property rule) or best protected by the 
shifting of an entitlement subject to a party’s willingness to pay objective 
damages (a liability rule).390  Carol Rose succinctly describes Calabresi’s and 
Melamed’s approach: 
On their account, the example generates four “rules,” two favoring the 
residence owner and two favoring the factory.  If the homeowner has 
the entitlement to be free of pollution, [Property] Rule 1 permits her to 
enjoin the factory’s pollution; but if her right is protected only by [Li-
ability] Rule 2, she has to endure pollution so long as the factory pays 
damages.  On the other hand, if the factory owner has the entitlement 
to pollute, protection through [Property] Rule 3 would allow him to do 
so freely.  Finally, by the famous and hitherto unexplored [Liability] 
Rule 4, Calabresi and Melamed opined that the factory may be entitled 
to pollute, but the entitlement may be protected only by a liability rule 
 
 383. Id. at 2176. 
 384. See id.; see also Jules L. Coleman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 41 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2008) (describing Calabresi’s liability rules as a notion of forced 
transfers). 
 385. See Rose, supra note 382, at 2175-76. 
 386. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1106-10. 
 387. Id. at 1105-06. 
 388. Id. at 1105. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. at 1105-06. 
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– so that the pollution entitlement can be bought by the resident at 
some measure of just compensation.391 
Highlighting how these rules are validated in the court system helps ar-
ticulate what types of interests society will collectively recognize and en-
force. 
“An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that some-
one who wishes to remove the entitlement from the holder must buy it from 
him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed 
upon by the seller.”392  Calabresi and Melamed suggest that this type of enti-
tlement involves little state interaction except to enforce the entitlement hold-
er’s veto power.393  It also reflects the holder’s subjective value of the enti-
tlement by honoring his choice to name his price.394  Calabresi and Melamed 
note that the collective action in an entitlement, subject to a property rule, 
occurs initially by society’s recognition of the entitlement.395 
On the other hand, Calabresi and Melamed suggest that some entitle-
ments may be subject to objectively determined valuation.396  “Whenever 
someone may destroy the initial entitlement . . . [by] pay[ing] an objectively 
determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”397  
That objective value often pits the subjective expectations of the entitlement 
holder against more collective concepts such as burdens, utility, and efficien-
cy.398  In this instance, the entitlement holder may find the entitlement shifted 
despite his subjective perception of its value.399 
Carol Rose describes the Calabresi Melamed Rule 2 as creating a “rhe-
torical puzzle” in the form of language – particularly around the term “liabil-
ity rule”: 
Consider the example for the liability rule’s “protection” of an enti-
tlement.  In the garden-variety liability rule case, Calabresi and Mela-
med’s Rule 2, the factory owner receives the right to pollute the near-
by resident’s air, but must pay damages.  Yet in this case, an observer 
might not think that the resident has an “entitlement protected by a li-
ability rule” at all.  Instead, she might think that the liability rule simp-
ly divides the entitlement differently and that the liability rule yields a 
different and diminished entitlement for the homeowner.  Compare the 
liability rule regime with either property rule: In the latter, the entitle-
ment holder has the whole meatball, so to speak, and the other party 
 
 391. Rose, supra note 382, at 2177-78. 
 392. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1092. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. See id. 
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has nothing – one has property, the other has zip.  Under either of the 
two liability rules, on the other hand, the meatball gets split: The fac-
tory has an option to pollute (or once exercised, an easement), while 
the homeowner has a property right subject to an option (or easement).  
For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to this latter kind of right as a 
PRSTO (or PRSTE), for “property right subject to an option (or ease-
ment).”400 
Rose’s alteration of language suggests that one effect of entitlements 
may be forcing property owners to absorb certain inconveniences.  Problem-
atically, the PRSTO is not free of its own limitations.401  Options rarely arise 
absent affirmative acts of parties.402  And easements, while they may arise on 
implied, expressed, prescriptive, or estoppel grounds, do not quite capture the 
essence of the liability intrusion.403  The better rationale draws on Rose’s 
initial instincts that the shadows of accident best explain the liability rule.404  
In this regard, Rule 2 [liability] is best understood as a social mechanism for 
forcing transfers of property (whether they are rights to be free of intrusion, 
entitlement to damages for such intrusions, or both).405  That is, society’s 
choice to prefer one entitlement above another is often based on the fact that 
the social identity at stake is conflicted.406 
Liability rules engage collective identity and information in two ways.  
First, they often reflect broader conceptions of what universal burdens are fair 
to impose on entitlement holders in light of subjective capacities and under-
standings of parties.407  For example, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., the 
court, in opting for a liability rule approach, questioned the ability of a deci-
sion in Boomer to ameliorate air pollution problems endemic to the indus-
try.408  The court noted that the air pollution problem is one that is presently 
above one party’s capability to resolve due to technological and economic 
limitations, thus making a property rule approach inappropriate.409  Second, 
identity-based policies might originate from legislative action but leave room 
for courts to apply a fair remedy to the parties.410  In Boomer, the court’s re-
sistance to applying a property rule was expressly predicated on leaving the 
collective identity making action to the legislature.411  Nevertheless, it was 
 
 400. Rose, supra note 382, at 2178-79. 
 401. Id. at 2179. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. at 2180. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1092-93. 
 408. 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970). 
 409. Id. 
 410. See supra note 343 and accompanying text. 
 411. 257 N.E.2d at 871. 
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fair for Boomer to internalize certain costs of this action.412  In Spur Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., the court applied a different lia-
bility rule precisely because of the identity work that the legislature already 
undertook.413  But after the identity choice was made, the court still had to 
decide how to fairly allocate burdens to the parties.414 
Lastly, some entitlements may not be shifted.  “An entitlement is inal-
ienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer 
and a willing seller.”415  Here, the state’s role is to determine two matters: 
who holds the entitlement and, if inalienable, to prevent its transfer.416  For 
example, in New York v. United States, Congress could not impose an uncon-
stitutional burden on states, even if they agreed to accept that burden.417  
These entitlements draw on purely objective applications of rights, regardless 
of whether parties bargained or courts otherwise decided.418 
In a framework that considers shifting entitlements in relation to collec-
tive identity, entitlements that shift via property rules and inalienable entitle-
ments represent opposite ends of the spectrum.419  Property rules draw on 
purely subjective expectations of the entitlement.  When property rules are 
applied, they represent the state’s choice to adopt one party’s particularized 
view.420  Inalienable entitlements are not subjective.421  In fact, inalienable 
entitlements do not shift at all because a broad collective identity establishes 
objective concerns to which entitlements must abate.422  Liability rules tend 
to consider subjective expectations of all parties while crafting shifting rules 
that respond to concerns beyond the parties.423 
 
 412. See id. at 875. 
 413. See 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (en banc). 
 414. Id. at 707-08. 
 415. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1092. 
 416. Id. at 1092-93. 
 417. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); see also Erin Ryan, 
Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules 
in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 418. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1111-15. 
 419. Id. at 1105-06. 
 420. Id. at 1092. 
 421. Id. at 1111-12. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. at 1107. 
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In homelessness cases described in Part II, homeless persons’ inability 
to articulate a property entitlement limited their legal relief to inalienable 
entitlements – the broadest and least specific of all entitlements.424  On the 
other hand, cities, landowners, and even service providers were able to assert 
broader property-based entitlement rules to achieve a desired result.425  In 
fact, by articulating the problem as one impacting a “property entitlement,” 
parties other than homeless persons are able to assert their individual identity 
into the space-resolution process, while homeless persons cannot.426 
Additionally, this construct of entitlement shifting due to choice (rather 
than one due to accident) tends to reify our perceptions for why homeless 
persons remain homeless.  That is, general policy surrounding homelessness 
tends to implicate individual actions of the homeless person that lead to 
her/his impoverished state.427  The choice then leaves the homeless to lie in 
the beds they made.  This binary view of homeless persons, without under-
standing the multiple causes leading to poverty, instability, and eventually 
homelessness, leads courts and local governments to measure homeless rights 
against those of responsible citizens who have paid their dues.428 
This creates what Marianna Valverde has termed a problem of social 
scale or dimensionality.429  Legal entitlements create different interactions 
amongst different orders – each with “its own scope, its own logic, and its 
own criteria for what is to be governed, as well as its own rules for how to 
govern . . . .”430  This allocation of legal entitlements “organizes legal gov-
 
 424. See sources cited supra Part II. 
 425. See discussion supra Part II. 
 426. This captures the essence of Nicholas Blomley’s point that 
[p]eople who do not own property . . . are treated with a good deal of ambiva-
lence, suspicion and even hostility.  This treatment extends to whole catego-
ries of people who do not enjoy the full exercise of private property rights, 
whether they be renters, occupants of social housing, or at an extreme, home-
less. 
BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING THE CITY, supra note 1, at 4. 
 427. See discussion supra Part II. 
 428. See supra Part II.C. 
 429. Valverde, supra note 74, at 141. 
 430. Id. 
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ernance, initially, by sorting and separating.”431  This means, as Valverde 
writes, that state-scale or global-scale constitutional rights are rarely coordi-
nated and harmonized with low level regulations governing specific urban 
spaces.”432  When rights and regulations are coordinated, their impact is rare-
ly transmitted or internalized.433  Instead, because legal rules appear to be 
scaled, legal powers and legal knowledge obtained by watching other dis-
putes still may not be meaningful in a jurisdiction applying similar constraints 
because the local scale suggests its action is different, appropriate, or validat-
ed by its own experience.434 
Thus, as Part II described above in relation to anti-camping ordinances, 
cities after Pottinger and Jones still asserted claims to prevent homeless per-
sons from camping on city property, believing that those decisions should not 
apply to their city’s rules.435  A key component in the scale problem that 
homeless governance presents is the tension between the inherently local 
large-scale-interest of the property owner (whether individual or city) and the 
objective small-scale-interest of the homeless community.436  Solving that 
scale problem requires looking beyond the legally adopted identities of prop-
erty owners and homeless persons and instead to their actual identities. 
B.  Asserting Subjective Homeless Identity in Legal Decision Making 
In the absence of homeless communities’ identities as a consideration in 
legal action, the homeless become invisible problems to be solved, rather than 
constituents impacted by city and court decisions.437  Taking homelessness 
seriously requires relationship and community building that reaches beyond 
current economic obstacles.438  It may mean, as Marianna Valverde has sug-
gested, some prior organizational work to ensure that the consultation process 
does not further marginalize marginal groups.439  This may require educating 
people about social and economic inequality, causes of homelessness, and the 
appropriate legal responses to homelessness.440  At core, these educational 
efforts ultimately should aim at reducing the tendency of courts and lawmak-
ers to treat homeless persons as a homogenous group.  Instead courts should 
recognize the differences that are present amongst homeless populations 
when weighing “one size fit all” regulations.441 
 
 431. Id. 
 432. Id. 
 433. See supra Part I.A. 
 434. Valverde, supra note 74, at 141. 
 435. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 436. See generally Valverde, supra note 74. 
 437. See VALVERDE, supra note 58, at 215. 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. 
 441. See SNOW & ANDERSON, supra note 50, at 7 (describing differences in home-
less identities). 
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It may also mean recognizing legally some form of relationship that 
homeless persons have to space.  For example, Joseph Singer has advocated 
for a social relations model of property in which rights and interests in prop-
erty and space are balanced towards the social propriety.442  Singer’s model 
invokes the dominant entitlement-shifting device as the liability rule, where 
subjective interests and objective interests intersect.443  Relating to homeless 
persons, critiques might suggest that solutions granting homeless persons the 
right to “be” somewhere do not achieve this balancing since the right be-
comes diluted across the entire population.444 
A third solution suggests that the community, having understood the na-
ture of homelessness, asserts its interest in property to form an objective bal-
ancing of all competing interests.  That is, when the community takes home-
lessness seriously, it may then, in turn, seek to assert its subjective expecta-
tion that ordinances and rules not be unfairly administered towards vulnerable 
populations.  I argue that this last approach – community adoption of home-
less perspectives – provides the greatest source for potentially finding home-
less solutions.  Importantly, it draws on Valverde’s conception of relationship 
and scale by identifying the homeless interests as community interests, in-
stead of as contrary interests.445  Community interests invoke the power of 
local governance in combination with the individual rights of persons viewed 
as stakeholders.446  Such a solution also draws on Singer’s and Blomley’s 
notions of property as a social system, responsive to the different kinds of 
demands that the community imposes.447 
Communities can manifest their subjective understandings of homeless-
ness by requiring projects to take into account the impact their projects will 
have on homeless communities.448  State Environmental Quality Review Acts 
should incorporate environmental justice accounts, such as how building pro-
jects change resource management for homeless and poverty-related groups.  
By acknowledging that building projects may have impacts on vulnerable 
 
 442. Joseph Singer pits the traditional ownership model of property against a 
more balanced social relations model.  See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: 
THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 2-3, 6 (2000).  Other scholars have similarly pointed to 
the dependence of the common law on ownership as its framing mechanism.  See 
Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127 (1990). 
 443. See SINGER, supra note 442, at 3. 
 444. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and Community, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 
371 (2000). 
 445. See VALVERDE, supra note 58, at 215. 
 446. See Valverde, supra note 74, at 143-44. 
 447. See Nicholas Blomley, The Borrowed View: Privacy, Propriety, and the 
Entanglements of Property, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 617, 639-40 (2005) (suggesting 
that even private property may have public entanglements); Joseph William Singer, 
No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1283, 1412 (1996) (articulating property as a social system subject to shared 
responsibilities). 
 448. See VALVERDE, supra note 58, at 215. 
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populations, homeless identity can be injected into the dispute resolution pro-
cess.449  Only Connecticut, Maryland, and Guam require projects to evaluate 
their impact as to low income populations.450  However, no other states with 
Environmental Impact Review Acts incorporate such requirements.  These 
statements could serve as powerful reminders that space allocation should be 
cognizant of detrimental effects, particularly towards vulnerable groups.  
Ideally, it would also reshape our image of low income housing away from 
opportunities for capital investment in the gentrifying city, towards opportu-
nities to invest in the social well-being of the humans that occupy them.451 
Second, cities and courts should avoid labeling homeless persons as nui-
sances, or other dehumanizing terms.  For example, one court described the 
 
 449. See Alan Ramo, Environmental Justice as an Essential Tool in Environmen-
tal Review Statutes: A New Look at Federal Policies and Civil Rights Protections and 
California’s Recent Initiatives, 19 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 41, 72 
(2013).  Professor Ramo notes: 
It is therefore incorrect to say that “social justice” is separate from CEQA, that 
CEQA does not consider social factors, or that environmental justice has no 
place in the CEQA context.  Environmental justice represents an insight into 
the relationship between social and economic factors on the one hand, and ac-
tual environmental impacts on people and their communities on the other.  
Environmental justice encapsulates this link between people and the way they 
treat each other and their environment.  Thus, consideration of race and 
broader demographics of a potentially impacted community is crucial to a 
proper, thorough, and sensitive environmental review. 
Id. 
 450. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-1b (West 2014) (“In the case of an action 
which affects existing housing, the evaluation shall also contain a detailed statement 
analyzing (A) housing consequences of the proposed action, including direct and 
indirect effects which might result during and subsequent to the proposed action by 
income group as defined in section 8-37aa and by race . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. 
RES. § 1-301 (West 2014) (defining “Environmental effects report” as “a report on 
each proposed State action significantly affecting the environment, natural as well as 
socioeconomic and historic” (emphasis added)); 22 GUAM ADMIN. R. & REGS. § Ap-
pendix H (1997) (requiring “[d]escription of long term impacts directly caused by the 
project or through secondary effects such as income distribution, population growth 
or shifts, additional stress on services”). 
 451. Nevertheless, even cities that might attempt to account for the loss of low 
income housing may not be able to enforce their own land-use schemes.  See Palm-
er/Sixth St. Props., L.P. v. City of L.A., No. CV 07-1346 CAS (FMO), 2010 WL 
1658963, at *1, *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010).  In Palmer/Sixth Street Properties, 
L.P. v. City of Los Angeles, a real estate developer brought an action challenging a 
Los Angeles Municipal ordinance that required developers to replace certain low-
income housing that previously existed prior to the development project.  Id. at *1.  
The developer filed two actions – a federal court action and a state court action seek-
ing a mandamus to order the zoning board to lift the restraint on the project.  Id.  The 
state court ordered the zoning board to lift the project restraint under the Costa-
Hawkins Rental Act, a California State legislative act that preserved property owners’ 
rights to self-determine rental rates for property.  Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1954.50-1954.535 (West 2013)). 
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homeless as urban pariahs that “coloniz[e] public space” forcing communi-
ties to evict them.452  Other courts have used the term nuisance to describe 
homeless activities or presence on city land.453  Associating homeless pres-
ence and survival activities as a social malfeasance does harm to individual 
homeless persons by implicating individuals to fictionalized group percep-
tions.454  This, in turn, has a reifying effect in which all activities of homeless 
persons become problematic.455  Homeless persons then become either pro-
jects to be pitied or problems to be solved, not persons with interests and so-
cial meaning.  They become visible, yet legally invisible, while NIMBYistic 
tendencies prevail.  Homeless persons, as vulnerable citizens, need cities, 
states, and courts to reclaim homeless identity not as social problems, but as 
constituents who are impacted by changing society. 
CONCLUSION 
Communities addressing homelessness often treat homeless persons as 
problems rather than seeking to resolve underlying social problems that lead 
to homelessness.  The lack of property identity leaves homeless persons vul-
nerable to misunderstanding, mistreatment, or mistaken purpose.  It also leads 
to legal identity that is diluted and without direct relation to the individual’s 
personal identity.  Homeless solutions necessitate injecting homeless persons’ 
individual identity into city and court discussions.  Requiring states to take 
cognizance of the impact of projects and language on homeless populations 
serves to remind government actors of the human toll in balance.  Moving 
forward, American prosperity should not only be reachable for all Americans, 
but should also reach back to ensure that the most vulnerable amongst us 
may, if not enjoy their prosperity, not be punished for not having it at all. 
 
 
 452. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1179 (Cal. 1995) (describing 
homeless as “[t]oday’s pariahs . . . who are homeless largely by necessity . . .”); Peo-
ple v. Chapman, No. A122393, 2010 WL 127595, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2010) 
(describing homeless as “[t]oday’s pariahs, an urban blight, given to colonizing public 
spaces, thereby provoking municipal crusaders to evict them . . .”) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
 453. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 454. See MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY, supra note 10, at 163. 
 455. Id. at 163 (stating that city ordinances that “control behavior and space such 
that homeless persons cannot do what they must in order to survive” criminalize sur-
vival itself). 
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